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NOTES
THE INDIANA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT:
-LEGISLATIVE SURGERY ON PATIENTS' RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
Medical malpractice litigation in the United States has been
increasingly characterized by larger recoveries,' highly publicized
suits,2 and an expansion of the duty of care owed by health care
providers.' The total number of claims filed each year has also
drastically increased;' today, one out of every six doctors prac-
1. In 1974, California juries granted six $1 million awards and one $4
million award to injured patients. A Wisconsin resident is presently suing a
doctor for nine million dollars. EVERYBODY'S MONEY, Autumn, 1975, at 10.
2. See, e.g., The Patient Becomes the Plaintiff, TIME, March 24, 1975,
at 62 (reporting recoveries of $4,025,000, $300,000 and $1,000,000); NEws-
WEEK, February 10, 1975, at 41.
Rapoport, "Dr. Nork Will See You Now," NEW TIMES, August 22, 1975,
at 27 (feature article on "perhaps the worst physician ever to practice medi-
cine in the United States," reporting that ten million dollars in judgments
against this one physician has already been entered, with twenty-five addi-
tional suits pending).
3. A particularly strict standard of care was imposed in Helling v.
Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), where the Supreme Court of
Washington reversed a jury verdict in favor of the defendant physicians
despite unanimous expert medical testimony that the failure to administer a
test for glaucoma was not an uncommon practice due to the very low incidence
of glaucoma within that class. See Note, Comparative Approaches to Liability
for Medical Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141 (1975).
Another example of the expansion of a health care provider's duty of
care is the gradual erosion of the "locality rule." In early days the "locality
rule" was adopted to protect rural doctors by restricting the physician's duty
of care to that degree of care, diligence and skill used by physicians gener-
ally in the same locality or community. As communications improved, as well
as the standardization of hospital procedures and physician's licensure, the
need for protective locality rules has decreased, and most states have dis-
carded the rule. Supporters for the continuation of the locality rule argue
that the effect of the rule keeps down the number of malpractice cases and
large jury verdicts. It has even been alleged that the elimination of the lo-
cality rule will open up the courts to expert witness "carpetbaggers." Wash-
ington Post, October 1, 1975, at 1.
4. Between 1955 and 1966 one Cleveland defense attorney estimated that
the number of medical malpractice suits in which he had been involved had
increased 400%. SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ExEcuTnvE REORGANIzATION, 91sT
CONG., 1ST SEss., A STUDY ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT VERSUS
THE PHYSICIAN 1 (Comm. Print 1969).
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ticing high risk operations can expect to be sued each year for
medical malpractice.' The fear of being sued permeates the entire
health care community and the impact of the medical malpractice
crisis has affected all parties involved. Courts have been flooded
with time consuming litigation." Insurance companies maintain
that they are losing huge amounts of money" as a result of the
increasing cost of providing health care insurance.' Health care
Contributing to the increased number of suits is a growing public aware-
ness of incompetent health care providers oftentimes performing needless yet
dangerous surgery. A recent series of articles in the Chicago Tribune, be-
ginning February 8, 1976, § A, at 1, disclosed the findings of recent studies
on the malpractice problem. Among the findings were:
-American surgeons, according to a Cornell University study, per-
form nearly 2.4 million unnecessary operations each year in which
11,900 patients die as the result of complications.
-An estimated 10,000 Americans die or suffer potentially fatal re-
actions after the administration of antibiotics that are not needed,
according to studies at the University of Florida and Ohio State
University medical schools.
-Errors in judgment result in 260,000 women undergoing needless-
hysterectomies each year, and 500,000 children are subjected to
unwarranted removal of tonsils and adenoids.
5. Position Paper and Backgrounder, St. Paul Fire and Marine Com-
pany 11 (1975) (overall average of claims filed against doctors in lowest
through highest risk category was one out of ten.)
6. Prior to the assignment of all medical malpractice cases in Chicago
to a special judge, many of the malpractice suits were filed two years before
the actual hearing. Chicago Tribune, November 27, 1975, § 3 at 1.
7. Jerrold V. Jerome, President of Argonaut Insurance Company, testi-
fied that his company lost $10,000,000 in 1974 in medical malpractice costs,
but yet found $10,200,000 for a dividend to be sent upstream to its parent com-
pany, the conglomerate Teledyne Corporation. TRIAL, May/June, 1975, at 15.
In 1974, Argonaut itself collected approximately $15,000,000 in premiums and
only paid out $250,000 in claims. The average pay-out in 1974 for the in-
dustry as a whole was $750 per doctor, whereas the average premium collected
per doctor was $3,500. Aitken, Medical Malpractice: The Alleged "Crisis" in
Perspective, 637 INs. L.J. 91, 97 (February, 1976). In the same year Argo-
naut experienced a $90,000,000 decrease in the value of its bond and stock
portfolio. Lindsey, "For Argonaut Profits Proved Illusory," New York Times,
June 8, 1975, at 49.
Unexplained increases in premiums have also been imposed upon hos-
pitals in 1975 with an average increase of 106% reported in ten District of
Columbia hospitals. One of these hospitals, Fairfax Hospital, has paid claims
of $31,282 since 1961 and total premiums of 1.03 million dollars. Despite
the excellent record of the hospital, the cost of professional liability insur-
ance increased from $69,577 in 1973 to $76,660 in 1974 and to $646,072 in 1975.
Pear, Malpractice Insurance Fees Swamp Area Hospitals, Washington Star,
October 1, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
8. Insurance companies are quick to point out that the cost of defend-
ing and litigating malpractice claims increases proportionately with. the num-
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providers" if they are even able to find insurers willing to bear
the risk,"0 are paying more for malpractice insurance." Ultimately,
consumer-patients are paying more for check-ups and treatment
because of the costs which are passed on to them.'2
ber of claims filed. However, a recent study by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare revealed that 50% of the claims filed in 1970 were
closed without the claims resulting in lawsuits. Of the other half of claims
filed, eighty percent of them never went to trial; they were settled by nego-
tiation and mutual agreement. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDU-
CATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 10 (1973).
9. As defined by Indiana statute and as used in this note, health care
provider includes:
[A] person, corporation, facility or institution licensed by this state
to provide health care or professional services as a physician, hos-
pital, dentist, registered or licensed practical nurse, optometrist, po-
diatrist, chiropractor, physical therapist or psychologist, or an offi-
cer, employee or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of his
employment.
IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-1 (a) (Supp. 1975).
10. Resistance by state legislators and state administrative agencies to
demands for further rate increases has caused insurance companies to termi-
nate their coverage for health care providers in several states. For example,
St. Paul Fire and Marine announced its withdrawal of all insurance policies
in Maryland after it was refused a 48% rate increase. Rowland, Maryland
Eyes Malpractice Claim Panel, Washington Star, October 1, 1975, § B, at 3,
col. 4. Similarly, the Argonaut Insurance Company threatened to cancel all
New York physician policies on July 1, 1975, after it was denied a hike of
196.8% in January, 1975. Argonaut had, however, received an earlier hike
of 93.5% in July, 1974. Malpractice Nightmare, TIME, March 24, 1975, at 62.
In Rhode Island, eight physicians and six patients have filed a $100 mil-
lion class action antitrust suit against the country's largest medical
malpractice insurance carrier, St. Paul Fire and Marine, and three
other carriers: Aetna Life and Casualty, Hartford Fire Insurance Co., and
Travelers Insurance Co. The plaintiffs charge that the insurance companies
conspired to discontinue writing policies unless the physicians accepted the
"claims made" policy in lieu of the "occurrence" coverage formerly offered.
BUSINESS WEEK, August 4, 1975, at 40.
11. Noticeable increases in rates for medical malpractice insurance be-
gan in New York about 1966 and increased 439% by 1971. Linster, Insurance
View of Malpractice, 38 INS. COUNSEL J. 528, 529 (1971). Hartford Insur-
ance Company has recently proposed a 267% increase for medical malprac-
tice coverage in Illinois. The new rates would increase annual premiums for
high-risk doctors from $10,000 to $35,000 for five million dollar liability in-
surance. Chicago Tribune, February 27, 1976, at 1.
12. A large amount of the increase paid by patients for health care
services has resulted from "defensive medicine" techniques whereby overly
precautionary treatment has resulted in redundant diagnostic tests and x-rays,
extensive recordation for possible litigation purposes and hesitation in embrac-
ing proven new techniques. Havighurst and Tangredi, "Medical Adversity
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Several remedial plans, as proposed by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, Secretary's Commission on Medi-
cal Malpractice" and various state legislatures, have attempted to
resolve malpractice disputes by non-adjudicatory means."' Some
of these plans which have received the most frequent attention
include: a medical review panel composed of doctors, lawyers
and/or laypersons, who review the validity and substantiality of
malpractice claims;" arbitration boards which, by agreement or
operation of law, bind the litigating parties to an independent
finding;'6 no-fault insurance plans which dispose of the concept
of negligence;" and joint underwriting insurance plans whereby
lnsurance"w-A No-Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assur-
ance, 613 INS. L.J. 69, 92 (1974).
13. Pursuant to a mandate by President Nixon in 1971, the Secretary
of Health, Education and Welfare developed a research plan to study the
malpractice problem. The final report, completed in 1973, is contained in two
volumes. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WEL-
FARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
(1973) [hereinafter cited as SECRETARY'S REPORT].
14. See generally SECRETARY'S REPORT at 214 et seq. (1973).
15. One of the earliest and most successful panel approaches is the Pima
County (Tucson, Arizona) Plan which was established in 1957 and is com-
posed of nine doctors and nine lawyers. The panel reviews the case and ren-
ders a decision as to whether there is a reasonable ground to believe mal-
practice was committed. Although a claimant is not barred from filing a
suit following an adverse finding from the panel, an attorney is bound to use
the greatest "professional good faith" before pursuing the matter further.
The success of the plan is normally attributed to the cooperation demon-
strated by the local bar and medical practitioners. This "esprit de corps" is
maintained through the active participation of both parties in the panel's de-
cision which promotes trust and confidence in the final determination. Morris,
Response to Ribicoff : Malpractice Suits vs. Patient Care, 37 INS. COUNSEL J.
206, 237 et seq. (1970) (other types of panels which are known as the New
Mexico Plan, the Portland Oregon Plan and the so-called New Jersey Plan
are also discussed). See also Note, Medical-Legal Screening Panels As An
Alternative Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims, 13 WILLIAM AND MARY
L. REV. 695, 713 (1972).
16. See Alternatives to Litigation, III: Contr-actual Problems in the
Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, Appendix:
SEcRwARY's REPORT (1973); Morris, Medical Report: Malpractice Crisis-A
View of Malpractice in the 1970's, 38 INS. COUNSEL J. 521, 524 (1971).
17. For a favorable view of tort liability in medical malpractice occur-
rences, see Kretzmen, The Malpractice Suit: Is it Needed?, 11 OSGOOiD HALL
L.J. 55 (1973). See also Ehrenzweig, Compulsory "Hospital-Accident" In-
surance: A Needed First Step Toward the Displacement of Liability for
"Medical Malpractice", 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 279 (1964); O'Connell, It's Time
for No Fault for Many Kinds of Accidents: A Proposal and an "Economic
Analysis," 42 TENN. L. REv. 145, 146-47 (1974); Note, Comparative Ap-
proaches to Liability for Medical Maloecurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141 (1975).
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all insurers within a state are required or agree to participate in
a common undertaking to insure health care providers."
Indiana approached the problem by enacting, on April 17,
1975, a new and comprehensive medical malpractice statute. The
Medical Malpractice Act ' essentially requires mandatory submis-
sion of all medical malpractice claims to a medical review panel
before any claim can be filed in a court.2 The panel, which is com-
posed of three health care providers," determines the liability of
an accused health care provider based on a showing of negli-
gence.22 Damage determinations, however, are left for resolution
by the parties.2 If no agreement can be reached on the amount
of damages or if the complaining party receives an adverse judg-
ment from the panel, 4 a suit may then be filed in court for a
jury determination on the question of liability and damages.
Two major provisions of Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act
introduce severe and unprecedented restrictions on a patient's
right to recover damages. One of these provisions places a maxi-
mum limitation of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) on
the amount of damages recoverable by an injured patient.2 Actual
damages for any injury or death cannot cumulatively exceed this
limit regardless of the amount or severity of loss incurred. An-
Contra, Lanzone, A Defense Lawyer Views Products Liability and Professional
Liability No-Fault, 625 INs. L.J. 82 (February, 1975).
18. For a recent legislative example of this plan, see WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 619.01(1) (a) and (1) (c) (2) and (7) (1975).
19. IND. CODE §§ 16-9.5-1-1 to 16-9.5-9-10 (Supp. 1975) [hereinafter re-
ferred to also as the Act]. Examples of recent legislation with provisions
similar to those adopted in the Indiana Act are cited in Brennan, Torts, 9 IND.
L. REV. 304, 359 n.135 (1975).
20. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-2 (Supp. 1975).
21. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-3 (Supp. 1975). If there is only one party de-
fendant in the suit, other than a hospital, two of the three panelists must be
from the same class of health care provider as the defendant. IND. CODE
§ 16-9.5-9-3(e) (Supp. 1975). For a definition of a health care provider, see
note 9 supra.
22. Negligence may be concluded if "defendants failed to comply with
the appropriate standard of care as charged in the complaint." IND. CODE
§ 16-9.5-9-7 (Supp. 1975). Tort in general is defined in the Act as "any legal
wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately
causing injury or damage to another." IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-1(g) (Supp.
1975).
23. The medical review panel is not permitted to assess damages; it is
limited in function to the determination of liability. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-7
(Supp. 1975).
24. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-8 (Supp. 1975).
25. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2(a) (Supp. 1975).
et al.: The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: Legislative Surgery on Patie
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1976
308 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
other provision"6 makes the general legal disability statute" ' in-
applicable to minors with medical malpractice claims. Indiana's
legal disability statute formerly permitted all minors who incurred
personal injuries during minority to file a claim for damages
within two years after their eighteenth birthday.2 8 Under the
Indiana Malpractice Act, a "minor" is classified as a person less
than six years of age. A "minor" between the ages of six and
eighteen with a medical-related injury now must file a claim
within two years after the negligent act before the statute of
limitations bars a claim for damages.
This note examines the constitutional validity of limiting dam-
ages on personal injuries and of abrogating the general legal dis-
ability statute to minors with malpractice claims, reaching the
conclusion that these two provisions are unconstitutional. The
$500,000 limitation deprives injured patients of their due process
of law by failing to provide a reasonable substitute for the loss
of their common law right to damages commensurate with the in-
jury incurred. Although a seemingly similar limitation on dam-
ages was upheld in workmen's compensation laws, a brief analysis
will reveal that these compensatory laws, unlike the Indiana Act,
provide a reasonable substitute in exchange for the abrogation of
the common law right to damages. It will also be shown that the
monetary limitation is an unwarranted violation of one's consti-
tutional right to trial by jury in that a jury is not permitted to
assess reasonable compensation on an individual basis. Finally,
the limitation on damages creates an impermissible irrebuttable
presumption by depriving an injured person of the right to prove
that his individual claim is not excessive even though it exceeds
the statutory limitation.
The second part of this note addresses the redefinition of
"minors" with medical malpractice claims as arbitrary and capri-
cious in violation of one's guarantee to equal protection of the
laws. The Act establishes two classes of minors, one based on
the type of claim involved and the other on age, both of which
violate a minor's right to the protection extended to other minors
26. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-3-1 (Supp. 1975).
27. IND. CODE § 34-1-2-5 (1973), provides:
Any person, being under legal disabilities when the cause of action
accrues, may bring his action within two (2) years after the dis-
ability is removed.
28. The phrase "under legal disabilities" was amended in 1973 from
persons under the age of twenty-one (21) to persons under the age of eigh-
teen (18) years. IND. CODE § 34-1-67-1 (Supp. 1975).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1976], Art. 5
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through the legal disability statute. However, before the consti-
tutionality of these provisions can be addressed, it is necessary to
become familiar with the general provisions in the Indiana Act.
PROVISIONS OF THE INDIANA ACT
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act makes several sweep-
ing changes in the areas of malpractice litigation and compensa-
tion. Several of the most innovative and significant features in-
clude the creation of a medical review panel and a patient's com-
pensation fund, adoption of a reduced statute of limitations for
minors, and monetary limitations on the amount of damages re-
coverable by patients, on the liability of individual health care
providers, and on the size of attorneys' fees.
Medical Review Panel
An important section of the Indiana Act establishes the au-
thority and procedure for using medical review panels to examine
medical malpractice claims." All malpractice claims against health
care providers must be initiated with these panels as a condition
precedent to later recourse in a court of law.3" The panels are
composed of three licensed physicians3' and one attorney.2 Al-
though the attorney has no vote in the final decision by the panel,
he participates in an advisory capacity as the panel's chairman."
Each party to the dispute has the right to select one physician or
29. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-1 (Supp. 1975).
30. No complaint may be filed in any court until the panel renders its
opinion. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-2 (Supp. 1975).
A similar medical review panel, where claims are first submitted before
any court action is taken, and composed of a circuit judge, a physician and
a lawyer, was recently held unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court as
violative of the state constitutional right to trial by jury embodied in ILL.
CONST. art. VI, §§ 1 and 9. See Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Ass'n,
No. 48075 (Ill. S. Ct., May 14, 1976). It was deemed violative of the consti-
tutional provision because the panel empowered its non-judicial members to
exercise a judicial function. The courts intimated, however, that such a re-
view panel might be devised, but it set no guidelines by which a legislature
might implement such a forum.
31. A physician is defined in the Act as a person with an unlimited
license to practice medicine in Indiana. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-1(b) (Supp.
1975). Physicians who are engaged in the teaching profession are also avail-
able for selection to the panel. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-3(a) (Supp. 1975).
32. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-3 (Supp. 1975). If, however, a nonphysician
is the only party defendant, other than a hospital, two of the panelists must
be from the same class of health care provider as that defendant. IND. CODE
§ 16-9.5-9-3(e) (Supp. 1975).
33. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-3 (Supp. 1975).
et al.: The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: Legislative Surgery on Patie
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health care provider as a member of the panel.3" Within ten days
after the complainant has forwarded notification of a selection,
the respondent must make known his choice for a prospective
panelist." Either party may twice challenge without cause a selec-
tion by the opposing party. 6 If both challenges are exercised, the
judge shall make a list of three qualified panelists. 7 Each side
will strike one of the names, leaving the finalist as the other
party's choice. 8 The two panelists who have been selected by the
opposing parties will then choose a third health care provider to
complete the panel."' If the complaining party and respondent
fail to agree on the selection of an acceptable advisory attorney, a
similar striking procedure is available.
After the selection of a panel, all evidence which the parties
intend to introduce must be promptly submitted." The evidence
must be in written form and "may consist of medical charts,
x-rays, lab tests, excerpts of treatises, depositions of witnesses,
including parties, and any other form of evidence allowable by
the medical review panel."42 Although depositions are available,
oral testimony or evidence is not received unless requested by the
panel." The panel may obtain any additional information, includ-
ing consultation with other medical authorities, which it deems
necessary to fully inform itself regarding the issue to be decided."
Both parties have full access to any material submitted to the
panel'
34. The panelist so selected is required to serve, IND. CODE § 16-9.5-
9-3(b) (Supp. 1975), unless he can, by affidavit, show facts which constitute
good cause for exclusion. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-3(d) (Supp. 1975).
35. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-3(f) (Supp. 1975).
36. The challenge must be in written form and made within ten days of
any selection. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-3(g) (Supp. 1975).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-3(b) (Supp. 1975).
40. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-3(h) (Supp. 1975). The procedure used to se-
lect the attorney-chairman differs slightly from that employed to choose the
other panelists. The clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court must randomly
select the name of five attorneys from the roles of the court. Each side will
then strike two names and the attorney remaining serves as the attorney-
chairman for that case.
41. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-4 (Supp. 1975).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-6 (Supp. 1975).
45. Id.
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Either party has the right to convene the panel after giving
ten days' notice to the other side."6 These meetings are intended
to permit either party "to question the panel concerning any mat-
ters relevant to issues to be decided by the panel before the issu-
ance of their report."""
When all evidence has been reviewed, the panel shall, within
thirty days, render one or more of the following expert opinions:
(1) The evidence supports the conclusion that the de-
fendant or defendants failed to comply with the appro-
priate standard of care as charged in the complaint;
(2) The evidence does not support the conclusion that
the defendant or defendants failed to meet the applicable
standard of care as charged in the complaint;
(3) That there is a material issue of fact, not requiring
expert opinion, bearing on liability for consideration by
the court or jury;
(4) The conduct complained of was or was not a factor
of the resultant damages. If so, whether plaintiff suf-
fered: (a) any disability and the extent and duration
of the disability, and (b) any permanent impairment and
the percentage of the impairment."
If the panel finds that the accused physician violated the
standard of care alleged in the complaint, the parties are free
to settle the amount of damages." Failure to reach an agreement
forces the patient to file his claim in a trial court of competent
jurisdiction.
Likewise, if the patient receives an adverse finding from the
screening panel, he may still file his claim in the courts."0 In the
event of disagreement in either situation, the patient must again
prove negligence and, providing that he is able to do so, the jury
will determine the amount of damages to be awarded.5'
46. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-5 (Supp. 1975).
47. Id.
48. IND. CODM § 16-9.5-9-7 (Supp. 1975).
49. See IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-7 (Supp. 1975). The only duty of the panel
is to express its expert opinion as to whether the evidence supports the conclu-
sion that the defendant acted or failed to act within the appropriate stan-
dards of care as charged in the complaint.
50. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-6 (Supp. 1975).
51. Id.
et al.: The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: Legislative Surgery on Patie
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If either party decides to litigate the claim in a court of law,
the findings of the panel may be later introduced as evidence;
the findings do not, however, give rise to any presumptive con-
clusions.52 Any member of the panel may also be called to testify
as a witness for either party."
Unlike the traditional policy of assigning costs of litigation
to the losing party, the Indiana Act requires that the prevailing
party who receives a majority opinion must pay all expenses of
the panel. 4 If no majority opinion is given, each side pays one-
half of the costs.5
Statute of Limitations
The filing of a claim before the panel tolls the applicable
statute of limitations from the date of receipt by the commis-
sioner to and including ninety days after the issuance of an
opinion by the panel.5 6
No claim may be brought against health care providers based
upon negligent professional services or health care rendered un-
less filed within two years from the date of the alleged act, omis-
sion or neglect.5 7 Although this two-year statute of limitations is
identical to a prior statutory limitation for adults," the new Act
modifies the law regarding minors. Minors who are less than six
years of age at the time of injury have until the age of eight to
file an action for damages.5 9 Any claim by a minor, incurring
injury while under legal disability but who is now older than
eight, has two years after the effective date of the Act, July 1,
1975, to bring suit.6
0
52. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-9 (Supp. 1975).
53. Id. Either party, at his own expense, shall have the right to call
any member of the panel as a witness. Any panelist so called is required to
appear and testify.
54. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-10 (Supp. 1975).
55. Id.
56. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-8 (Supp. 1975).
57. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-3-1 (Supp. 1975).
58. IND. CODE § 34-4-19-1 (1973).
59. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-3-1 (Supp. 1975). No legal disability, except for
the explicit provisions regarding minority, has any tolling effect on the two-
year malpractice statute of limitations. The general legal disability statute,
IND. CODE § 34-1-2-5 (1971), which permitted persons to bring their action
two years after the disability was removed, is thus abrogated with regard to
all medical malpractice claims.
60. IND. CoDE § 16-9.5-3-2 (Supp. 1975).
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Damages: Their Source and Amount
Assuming that the parties did not agree upon a satisfactory
amount of damages, the complaining party may submit this ques-
tion to the trial court." No claims submitted to the jury, how-
ever, are to include the dollar amount in the ad damnum clause.
The prayer for relief must simply be for reasonable damages "in
the premises." 2 Damages for injury or death, no matter how
serious or consequential, may not be awarded in excess of $500,000
for any claim."3
Qualified health care providers" are immune to liability for
any amount beyond $100,000.' Liability for any judgment up to
this amount must be insured through private or personal insur-
ance. A judgment or settlement rendered against an individual
health care provider in excess of $100,000 will be paid from a
newly created patient's compensation fund."
The patient's compensation fund is to be collected, received
and administered by the Commissioner of Insurance for the State
of Indiana. 7 The funds are to be held in trust along with any
interest or income arising therefrom and will be deposited in a
segregated account; under no circumstances is it to become part
of the general fund of the state." The fund is to be used solely
for the purpose of paying claims arising from health care pro-
vider injuries in excess of $100,000."'
To create the fund, a surcharge is levied on all health care
providers in Indiana."° The individual insured is responsible for
a percentage rate of the premium he pays for his private insur-
ance coverage."' This percentage, determined by the insurance
61. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-6 (Supp. 1975).
62. Id.
63. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2 (Supp. 1975).
64. To be qualified and thereby receive the protection of the Act, all a
health care provider need do is obtain liability insurance in the amount of
$100,000 per occurrence and pay a surcharge to the commissioner of insur-
ance to finance the newly created patient compensation fund. IND. CODE § 16-
9.5-2-1 (Supp. 1975). If a health care provider fails to qualify, he is subject
to unlimited liability. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-5 (Supp. 1975).
65. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2(b) (Supp. 1975).
66. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2(c) (Supp. 1975).
67. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-4-1(a) (Supp. 1975).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-4-1(b) (Supp. 1975).
71. Id.
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commission and based upon actuarial principles, may not exceed
10% of the cost on the individual's premium. 2 Individual claims
against the fund will not be paid until all claims are computed at
the end of the year. '
Attorney's Fees and Miscellaneous Provisions
Indiana's Act also limits an attorney's contingency fee to 15%
of any recovery from the patient's compensation fund." This ceil-
ing does not, however, restrict an attorney's rate on contingency
fees from recoveries less than $100,000 which are payable from
the health care provider's insurer. As an alternative method of
payment, a patient can arrange to pay for costs and services ren-
dered by an attorney on an hourly or daily basis."5 Such an
arrangement, however, must be evidenced by a written agree-
ment at the time of employment."'
Several other sections of the Act further seek to reduce the
incidence of malpractice claims and to protect the continuation
of health care services. One of these sections requires a manda-
tory reporting of all claims filed with the panel to the state in-
surance commissioner," who will notify the "appropriate board
of professional registration and examination for review of the
72. Id.
73. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-4-1(a) (Supp. 1975).
74. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-5-1(a) (Supp. 1975). The amount of attorneys'
fees collected from final judgments has been estimated to consume 50% of
the premiums collected for medical malpractice insurance. Note, Comparative
Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141, 1155
(1975). Another 25% is consumed by the insurer. This permits the patient
to recover only 16% to 25% of the insurance premium. Id. at 1155 n.75.
It is not clear, however, that the contingency fee arrangement has been
the primary cause of the increasing costs of insurance coverage. England has
also experienced an extraordinary increase in the cost of malpractice litiga-
tion-a threefold increase in the past five years. Shayne, Meritless Malprac-
tice Cases: A Fragile Dilemma, TRIAL, May/June, 1975, at 30. Since England
does not utilize the contingency system in medical malpractice actions, it is
absurd to conclude that the contingency fee system is responsible for the in-
creased number of claims. See generally Addison and Baylis, The Malpractice
Problem in Great Britain, SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 13, at 854 and 860.
75. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-5-1(b) (Supp. 1975).
76. Id.
77. The report, which must be filed both by the plaintiff's attorney and
by the health care provider or his insurer, must be filed within sixty days
following final disposition of the claim. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-6-1 (Supp. 1975).
The report must inform the commissioner of the nature of the claim, damages
asserted and alleged injury, attorney's fees and other litigation expenses, and
the amount of any settlement or judgment. Id.
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fitness of the health care provider to practice his profession.""
The Act also provides insurance coverage for a health care pro-
vider who is unable to receive insurance from at least two private
companies.79 Finally, a temporary provision of the Act provides
for the creation of a study commission to make additional and
further analysis of the medical malpractice problem, the effect
of the Indiana Act, and alternate approaches of comparable law. 0
The thirteen-member commission is to submit a final report to
the Legislative Council and the Governor by December 31, 1976."
Thus, Indiana's Act is a fairly comprehensive response to the
medical malpractice insurance problem. Yet two provisions in
particular, the $500,000 limitation on recoverable damages and
the partial abrogation of the minor disability statute, will en-
counter serious constitutional challenge.
LIMITING THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL DAMAGES:
DuE PROCESS VIOLATIONS
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act limits all damages for
any negligent conduct to a maximum of $500,000. This novel re-
striction raises several constitutional questions, one of which is
the denial to injured patients of their right to due process of law.
Foremost among the Act's deficiencies is its failure to provide
any appreciable equivalent or reasonable substitute for the abso-
lute limitation on a patient's right to damages. In absence of such
quid pro quo, the maximum limitation violates due process rights
found in the United States and Indiana Constitutions. Further-
more, the limitation violates the state constitutional right to a
jury trial by depriving the jury from determining reasonable dam-
78. The board shall have the power to discipline the health care provider
in the following ways: censure, probation, suspension, or revocation of his
license. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-6-2 (Supp. 1975).
79. IND. CODE §§ 16-9.5-8-2; 16-9.5-8-6 (Supp. 1975). The risk manager,
who is appointed by the commissioner, IND. CODE § 16-9.5-8-3 (Supp. 1975),
may either accept or refuse a policy to the applicant. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-8-7
(Supp. 1975). The risk manager's decision is subject to appeal and review
by the commissioner. Id.
The impact of this section may have little, if any, effect. There was no
evidence throughout the legislative hearings preceding the Act that insurance
coverage in Indiana was unavailable. Rather, the real problem, at least as
urged by the medical profession, was the increasingly high cost of coverage.
Mallor, A Cure for the Plaintiff's Ills, 51 IND. L.J. 103 (1975).
80. Section 2 of Acts 1975, P.L. 146. This section is to expire on Janu-
ary 1, 1977.
81. Id.
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ages which are commensurate with the actual injury sustained.
Finally, the $500,000 limitation creates an irrebuttable presump-
tion based on the assumption that awards in excess of that amount
are excessive. A patient is not permitted to rebut this assumption
even though it is not necessarily or universally true in fact. There-
fore, the presumption also violates due process of law by prevent-
ing a patient from recovering reasonable damages commensurate
with the injury incurred.
A. Failure of the Malpractice Act to Provide A Reasonable Sub-
stitute
The $500,000 limitation on the recovery of damages in the
Indiana Medical Malpractice Act has been defended as being anal-
ogous to the limitations found in workmen's compensation laws.
Proponents of the limitation on medical malpractice recoveries
point out several seeming similarities between workmen's com-
pensation and the new Act. Both enactments set ceilings on the
amount of recovery that a claimant is entitled to receive for a
single claim, and both may compensate for personal losses from
a special fund created for that purpose. Because of these simi-
larities, it is argued that the Indiana Act should survive consti-
tutional challenge for the same reasons that the workmen's com-
pensation laws were accepted. A close examination of the two
laws demonstrates the tenuous nature of this analogy and shows
that the similarities are artificial and illusory. Workmen's com-
pensation, a system which completely superceded the common law
action, provided injured employees a reasonable substitute for
their abridged common law rights. The Indiana Act, however,
neither abrogates the common law cause of action nor provides
a substitute for the loss of an injured patient's right to compen-
sation commensurate with the damages sustained. Accordingly, the
Indiana Act violates due process as secured by the fourteenth
amendment.
1. Workmen's compensation laws
Workmen's compensation legislation was a response to the
increasing number of industrial accidents and the simultaneous
decrease in the employee's ability to recover damages for work-
related injuries." The decreased ability of an employee to recover
damages from his employer under a common law action was caused
in large part by the judicially created defenses of the fellow-
82. See generally A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
37 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as LARSON].
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servant rule,8 3 contributory negligence," ' and assumption of risk
doctrine." As a result of these defenses, together with difficulty
in establishing causation and negligence, added costs of delay
and expensive litigation, injured employees found it extremely
difficult to recover damages for work-related injuries." The em-
ployee's common law remedy was, as a practical matter, often-
times illusory. 7
In an effort to protect employees from bearing the entire
loss of industrial accidents, courts began to abrogate the employ-
er's common law defenses by making exceptions to the fellow-
83. The fellow servant rule, a limitation to the rule of vicarious liability,
held that the employer was not liable for injuries caused solely by the negli-
gence of a fellow servant. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 528
(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
The fellow servant exception to the general rule of vicarious liability had
its origin in the famous case of Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M.&W. 1 (1837). In
that case, an employee was denied recovery for damages from his employer
when a fellow servant overloaded a van which broke down and injured the
plaintiff-employee. The reason for that decision, according to Lord Abinger,
was to avoid the "alarming" examples for employer's liability for employee's
negligence.
American courts were quick to follow this rule. See Farwell v. Boston &
Worcester R.R., 4 Mete. 49 (Mass. 1842) (railroad held immune from lia-
bility to one of its engineers for injury caused by one of its switchmen.)
84. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff, con-
tributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. PROS-
SER, supra note 83, at 416. Contributory negligence was first recognized as a
defense in Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60 (K.B. 1809).
85. A plaintiff who has,
given his consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct
toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a known risk
arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone,
is said to have assumed the risk and thereby loses a cause of action if injury
occurs. PROSSER, supra note 83, at 440.
"Assumption of risk" was also recognized as an employer's defense in
Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M.&W. 1 (1837). Lord Abinger recognized that,
the servant is not bound to risk his safety in the service of his mas-
ter, and may, if he thinks fit, decline any service in which he reason-
ably apprehends injury to himself, and in most of the cases in which
danger may be incurred, if not in all, he is just as likely to be ac-
quainted with the probability and extent of it as the master.
LARSON, supra note 82, § 4.30 at 26.
86. Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 151 P. 398 (1915).
87. "The employee at common law was remediless without question in
83 percent of all cases," and of the remaining 17 percent, the defense of as-
sumption of risk precluded many claims. LARSON, supra note 82, § 4.30 at 17.
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servant rule,"8 refusing to apply the defense of assumption of
risk to violations of a safety statute,"' and adopting comparative
negligence rules to replace contributory negligence principles."
Although the reduced availability of these defenses increased the
number of recoveries for some employees, the basic problem of
inadequate recovery remained, since the majority of injuries were
not caused through the negligence of the employer.'
Compensation laws were drafted to remove the concept of
fault and to make the risk of accidents a part of the burden that
industry itself should bear. As an element in the cost of produc-
tion, payments for employees' injuries could be added to the cost
of the article and carried by the community in general."3 The
88. See generally Northern Pac. R.R. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642 (1886);
Tedford v. Los Angeles Elec. Co., 134 Cal. 76, 66 P. 76 (1901); Smith v. Erie
R.R., 38 Vroom 636, 67 N.J.L. 636, 52 A. 634 (1902); Flike v. Boston and
A.R.R., 53 N.Y. 549, 13 Am. Rep 545 (1873).
89. See Fitwater v. Warren, 206 N.Y. 355, 99 N.E. 1042 (1912).
90. See Augusta S.R. Co. v. McElmurry, 24 Ga. 75 (1858); Galena and
C.U.R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858); L.N. & Gn. S.R.R. v. Fleming, 82 Tenn.
128 (1884).
91. The classification of causes of accidents resulting in personal injury
to the employee have been categorized as:
(1) Negligence or fault of employer .. ........ . 16.81%
(2) Joint negligence of employer and injured employee . 4.66
(3) Negligence of fellow servant .. ......... . 5.28
(4) Acts of God ................... 2.31
(5) Fault or negligence of injured employee ...... .28.89
(6) Inevitable accidents connected with the employment . 42.05
LARSON, supra note 82, at 27, citing BUREAU OF LABOR BULLRTIN (January,
1908).
92. See Ex Parte Puritan Banking Co., 208 Ala. 375, 94 So. 347 (1922);
Edson v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 206 Cal. 124, 273 P. 572 (1928); Union Iron
Works v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 190 Cal. 33, 210 P. 410 (1922); Sangamon
Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm., 315 Ill. 534, 146 N.E. 492 (1925); Austin
Co. v. Brown, 121 Ohio St. 271, 167 N.E. 874 (1929); Town of Germantown
v. Industrial Comm., 178 Wis. 642, 190 N.W. 448 (1922).
93.
They [compensation payments] might be catalogued with breakage
and wear and tear of machinery and equipment, all of which are, in
the final analysis, borne by the community, and such compensation
may safely be said to be a charge upon the community rather than
the industry because the expense thereof is always included in the
sale price of the commodity, and hence is paid for by the consuming
public.
W. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1 at 5 (1932) [hereinafter cited
as SCHNEIDER].
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payments awarded to employees were calculated as compensation
for lost wages rather than damages for wrongful injury."4
In departing from the view that amounts received by em-
ployees were damages, the workmen's compensation scheme was
adopted as an entirely new and comprehensive system of law."5
The common law cause of action based on negligence was displaced
in its entirety." Compensatory laws were instead founded upon
the principle of insurance whereby employees received compensa-
tion for events not within the control of either employer or em-
ployee."" Therefore, compensation was no longer dependent upon
wrongful conduct of the employer or fellow employees.
The workmen's compensation scheme was justified as pro-
moting the interests of society in general and protecting both
employee and employer. Society was protected from having in-
jured employees, unable to recover in a damage action, from being
placed on welfare rolls."' In addition, the tension between
employer and employee which often followed the filing of claims
for negligent actions was alleviated."9 Employees were guar-
anteed of receiving at least moderate compensation in al/
cases of injury." Although the employee was no longer able to
recover as much as he could potentially receive in a traditional
negligence action, 0 he was relieved of the almost insurmountable
burden of establishing negligence or proving the amount of dam-
ages. 2 Furthermore, a speedy remedy made compensation less
expensive to obtain and more valuable during times of need. Em-
ployers were protected from,
94. Shelton Lead and Zinc Co. v. State Ind. Comm., 100 Okla. 188, 229
P. 255 (1924).
95. SCHNEIDER, supra note 93, at §§ 4, 17, 18; Hotel Equipment Co. v.
Liddell, 32 Ga. App. 590, 124 S.E. 92 (1924).
96. Warren v. Indiana Tel. Co., 217 Ind. 93, 102 N.E.2d 399 (1940).
It has been noted that:
[C]ompensation laws constitute a statutory departure from, or as
commonly stated are in derogation of the common law, they are not
supplemental, cumulative, amendatory or declaratory of the common
law, but wholly substitutional of it.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 93, at § 6. See also Federal Cement & Tile Co. v.
Pruitt, 128 Ind. 126, 146 N.E.2d 557 (1957).
97. SCHNEIDER, supra note 93, at 3.
98. Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Gerard, 201 Wis. 474, 230 N.W. 622 (1930).
99. SCHNEIER, supra note 93, at 6-7.
100. New York Central RR. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 204 (1917).
101. See note 160 infra.
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uncertain verdicts and possible ruinous verdicts that
might bankrupt the business, to the injury, not only of
the particular employer and all other workmen employed
by him, but of society generally."0 3
Thus, all parties benefitted from the workmen's compensation
legislation. Because of this mutual benefit and because prior
rights and benefits were reasonably exchanged for new rights
and benefits, this no-fault system of reparations was upheld as a
valid exercise of a state's police powers.' 4
While these laws were generally accepted by employees, who
forfeited their common law right to damages and gained the
statutory right to recover compensation for all work-related in-
juries, a strong challenge was advanced by employers. This chal-
lenge, questioning the constitutionality of abrogating common law
defenses, was flatly rejected by the Supreme Court in Arizona
Employers' Liability Cases:' 5
[T]hese are no more than rules of law, deduced by the
courts as reasonable and just . . . in the absence of legis-
lation. They are not placed ... beyond the reach of the
state's power to alter them.' 6
Common law rights and defenses are merely duties, recognized by
law, which are continuously altered by legislation to reflect chang-
ing relationships and needs within society. "No person has a
vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it
shall remain unchanged for his benefit."'0 " Thus, the abro-
gation of common law rights, through legislation, is generally
permissible." 8
102. New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
103. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 403 (1919).
104. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 425 (1919); New
York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 207 (1917); Second Employer's
Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 52 (1911); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R.
v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 571 (1911).
105. 250 U.S. 400 (1919).
106. Id. at 421 (emphasis omitted).
107. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876), followed in New York
Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917); Chicago & Alton R.R.
v. Transbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 76 (1914); Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1911); Martin v. Pittsburg & Lake Erie R.R.
203 U.S. 284, 294 (1906); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884).
108. The Supreme Court stated with regard to a workmen's compensa-
tion statute:
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A statute may not, however, displace common law rights in
violation of due process of law.'"" A reasonable and just alterna-
tive for pre-existent rights must be substituted in its place."' One
set of rights must be exchanged as a quid pro quo for the former
source of rights."' This quid pro quo was found present in the
workmen's compensation laws. This system for compensation sat-
isfied the right under the old system which it replaced because
all parties benefitted." 2 Since the abrogation of the common law
defenses and imposition of liability without fault was neither arbi-
trary, unjust nor unreasonable, the adoption of the workmen's
compensation laws was found to meet the requirements of due
process.'
It is settled by the decisions of this Court and by an overwhelming
array of state decisions, that such statutes are not open to constitu-
tional objection because they abrogate common law defenses or im-
pose liability without fault.
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 422 (1923). See Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876); McKinster v. Sager, 163 Ind. 671, 72 N.E.
854, 859 (1904).
109.
Except as forbidden or controlled by some provision of the state Con-
stitution, or of the Constitution of the United States or laws and
treaties made under it, the legislature has power to enact statutes
which change the rules of the common law, however ancient.
Manley v. State, 196 Ind. 529, 532, 149 N.E. 51, 52 (1925).
110. In New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917), the
Supreme Court observed with regard to a workmen's compensation statute:
[I]t perhaps may be doubted whether the State could abolish all
rights of action on the one hand, or all defenses on the other, with-
out setting up something adequate in their stead. No such question
is here presented, and we intimate no opinion on it. The statute
under consideration sets aside one body of rules only to establish
another system in its place. If the employee is no longer able to re-
cover as much as before in the case of being injured through the
employer's negligence, he is entitled to moderate compensation in all
cases of injury, and has a certain and speedy remedy without the
difficulty and expense of establishing negligence or proving the
amount of damages.
Id. at 201.
111. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Daniels, 81 Misc. 2d 373, 367 N.Y.S.2d
419, 425 (Sup. Ct. 1975), rev'd, No. 359 (Ct. App., N.Y., Nov. 25, 1975). In
reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals did not reach the question of
whether the "reasonable substitute" test was constitutionally mandated be-
cause it found that the "no fault" law under consideration did, in fact, con-
tain a "reasonable substitute."
112. See notes 166-72 infra and accompanying text.
113. Page v. New York Realty Co., 59 Mont. 305, 196 P. 871 (1921);
State ex rel. Amerland v. Hagan, 44 N.D. 306, 175 N.W. 372 (1919); Mat-
thiesen & Hegler Zinc Co. v. Indian Bd., 284 Ill. 378, 120 N.E. 249 (1918).
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Workmen's compensation law thus completely readjusted the
relations between the employer and employee."" Although each
party lost prior rights, each gained a corresponding benefit. The
specific benefit moving to the employee for the loss of his com-
mon law right to damages was a fixed guarantee to compensation
for all work-related injuries, not merely those where the employer
was negligent. On the other hand, the employer lost his common
law defenses in exchange for the protection against recurrent liti-
gation and unknown damages. Accordingly, each party received
a benefit for the particular interest which he surrendered to
the common welfare. This quid pro quo is not present in the
Indiana Medical Malpractice Act because the patient receives no
appreciable benefit for surrendering his right to damages which
are commensurate with his injury.
2. Indiana's Act distinguished
Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act is distinguishable from
workmen's compensation laws examined above by several major
differences. Unlike workmen's compensation, the Indiana Act
fails to provide reasonable substitutes for the loss and severe im-
pairment of certain common law rights. This failure to provide
reciprocal benefits, especially for the ceiling on patients' recover-
able damages, violates the minimal requirements of due process.
Although abrogating claimants' interests in common law
rights,"' workmen's compensation laws withstood constitutional
challenge because they provided employees with reasonable sub-
stitutes for their former rights."' Under the compensatory laws,
an employee's remedy was broadened to include all work-related
injury, not merely injury for which the employer was negligent." 7
The concept of fault was removed as a basis for recovery, thereby
eliminating the task of establishing liability for negligent acts."8
The traditional defenses of contributory negligence, assumption
of risk and fellow-servant rule were similarly removed." 9 An-
other benefit received by employees was the guarantee in all work-
related injuries of a definite, albeit moderate, amount of compen-
114. New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 196 (1917.)
115. Warren v. Indiana Tel. Co., 217 Ind. 93, 102 N.E.2d 399, 403 (1940).
116. New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1916). See
note 110 supra and accompanying text.
117. SCHNEIDER, supra note 93, at § 6.
118. Id.
119. See note 106 supra.
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sation prescribed by a scheduled rate of recovery.' 0 Parties were
also assured of prompt recovery with minimal litigation ex-
penses.' In exchange for these statutory benefits, an employee
surrendered his common law right to damages, an independent
determination of actual damages commensurate with the loss in-
curred, and the right to a trial by jury for a determination of
employer liability and damages.122 In short, courts found a quid
pro quo resulting from the new system of compensation.
Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act does not, however, pro-
vide reciprocal benefits to the patient. In fact, the litigant re-
ceives none of the statutory benefits which employees obtained
through workmen's compensation for the severe impairment of
his right to recover damages. The basis for recovery, unlike work-
men's compensation, remains the same as established by the com-
mon law.' 3 Causation and negligence must still be proved as a
prerequisite to damages; the patient remains subject to such de-
fenses as contributory negligence and assumption of risk. There
is no guarantee that any loss incurred by injured patients will be
recompensed since recovery is completely dependent upon a suc-
cessful showing of negligence. The requirement that all claims
be initially filed with a medical review panel suggests that the
new procedure will make prompt recovery and lower litigation
costs even less likely than under the former system.
The only potential benefit received by patients under the
Indiana Act is the guarantee, if the panel finds in his favor, of
expert witnesses to appear and testify in his behalf.'2 ' But, as
120. See note 100 supra.
121. See note 103 supra.
122. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
123. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-1(h) (Supp. 1975), provides:
"Malpractice" means any tort or breach of contract based on health
care or professional services rendered, or which should have been ren-
dered, by a health care provider, to a patient.
IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-1(g) (Supp. 1975), defines tort as,
any legal wrong, breach of duty or negligent or unlawful act or
omission proximately causing injury or damages to another.
124. If called by one of the parties, the member of the panel is required
to appear and testify at trial. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-9 (Supp. 1975).
It may be argued that injured patients will receive a benefit in lower
medical costs and more available medical services, both of which will stem
from the lower insurance rates which result from the limitation on damage
awards. The difficulty with this argument is readily apparent. Malpractice
victims must pay the costs of these benefits which would be enjoyed by all
of society. See Note, A Constitutional Perspective on the Indiana Medical
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before, the plaintiff must still bear the cost of this testimony.
'2 5
More importantly, however, with the erosion of the "locality
rule," 12 6 it has become increasingly easier to find and retain
qualified experts to testify. The "conspiracy of silence" is simply
not the formidable problem it once was. It is clear, then, that
this single "benefit" grants victims of malpractice relatively little.
The loss of common law rights and benefits without the sub-
stitution of any substantial statutory benefits is particularly un-
fortunate in light of the need of those particular individuals upon
whom the Act forces the brunt of the burden. By limiting dam-
ages to $500,000, the Act deprives compensation to those persons
who are least able to bear it-the acutely, grievously and often-
times permanently injured. "Thus," as one commentator aptly
observed, "the individual most severely injured will lose the most
under the Malpractice Act."" 7 Since the victims of malpractice,
especially those most seriously injured, gain no perceptible bene-
fit for the loss of their fundamental common law right to dam-
ages, the $500,000 maximum ceiling of damage awards in the In-
diana Medical Malpractice Act violates due process of law as
secured by the fourteenth amendment.' 8
This limitation of damages, coupled with the failure of the
Indiana Act to alter the common law cause of action, suffers from
yet another defect. The limitation, by restricting the right to a
jury to be the sole arbiter on the appropriate amount of damages,
violates a patient's right to damages commensurate with injury.
Malpractice Act, 51 IND. L.J. 143, 152 (1975). This societal quid pro quo
argument was rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court in Wright v. Central
DuPage Hospital Ass'n, No. 48075 (Ill., May 14, 1976), wherein the court
stated:
This quid pro quo does not extend to the seriously injured medical
malpractice victim and does not serve to bring the limited recovery
provision within the rationale of the cases upholding the constitu-
tionality of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Slip opinion at 8.
125. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-9 (Supp. 1975).
126. The "locality rule" generally holds that allowance in the standard
of care must be made for the type of community in which the physician carries
on his practice. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164 (4th ed.
1971).
127. Note, A Constitutional Perspective on the Indiana Medical Mal-
practice Act, 51 IND. L.J. 143, 152 (1975).
128. The $500,000 limitation in the Illinois medical malpractice act was
held to violate due process as well as equal protection of the law in Wright v.
Central DuPage Hospital, No. 75L 21088 (Cook Cty. Cir. Ct., Nov. 26, 1975),
appeal docketed, No. 48075, Ill. Supreme Court, January Term, 1976.
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By fettering the jury's discretion, the Act contravenes the con-
Stitutional right to a trial by jury.
B. Deprivation of the Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial for
Determination of Reasonable Damages
The limitation of $500,000 on all malpractice claims under the
Indiana Medical Malpractice Act effectively violates a patient's
right to have a jury determine damages commensurate with the ac-
tual injury sustained. The jury's duty to determine damages is im-
plicitly protected by the express guaranteed in Article 1, § 20 of
the Indiana Constitution of a trial by jury in civil actions.'29 Al-
though the Act does not expressly preclude the right to a jury
in civil cases,13 ° the legislative restriction on medical malpractice
claims, by impeding the jury from freely performing its function
of assessing damages, deprives the patient of his constitutional
right to an unfettered jury determination of reasonable damages.
A brief reflection on the historical context and the manner in
which courts have interpreted the right to a jury trial reveals a
constitutional violation resulting from this unprecedented legis-
lative interference with a jury's duty to determine damages.
129. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 20, provides: "In all civil cases, the right to
trial by jury shall remain inviolate."
130. The Act does expressly prohibit the right to trial by jury in one
limited respect. When the insurer admits liability up to the statutory maxi-
mum of $100,000, and the insurer, claimant and the commissioner of insur-
ance are unable to agree on the additional amount owing from the patient
compensation fund, the "court shall determine the amount for which the fund
is liable and render a finding and judgment accordingly." IND. CODE § 16-9.5-
4-3(5) (Supp. 1975). Since the claimant in this situation is not even given
the opportunity to request a jury, the constitutional violation is quite obvious.
It is argued by one writer, however, that since the Act compensates the
claimant for the denial of a jury trial by establishing the liability of the
provider as a matter of law, a court may find sufficient quid pro quo to
overcome the rather obvious constitutional infringement. See Recent Devel-
opments: Medical Malpractice, 9 IND. L. REV. 358, 371 (1975).
Another recent writer has construed IND. CODE § 16-9.5-4-3 (Supp. 1975)
to grant the court, when a claim against the compensation fund is made, the
power to recompute all damage awards, thereby depriving the jury of the
power to award damages. See Note, A Constitutional Perspective on the Indi-
ana Medical Malpractice Act, 51 IND. L.J. 143, 156 (1975). A careful read-
ing of Section 3 of Chapter 4 reveals that the provision is limited to settle-
ment proceedings. Section 3 only applies when the insurer admits liability
for the first $100,000 and the commissioner, insurer of the health care pro-
vider and the claimant cannot agree among themselves on the added sum
which should be paid from the compensation fund.
325
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The right to trial by jury has long been regarded as a basic
and indispensable feature of Anglo-American jurisprudence.' 3 '
Originating in the Magna Carta, 3 ' the right to trial by jury in
civil cases was adopted, expanded, and strengthened in this coun-
try, as evidenced by its incorporation into the United States Con-
stitution 3 and the constitutions of many states.'3
Indiana, recognizing that the right to trial by jury is "the
most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy or wish
for,"'3 5 enacted its constitutional guarantee on November 1,
1885. ' This constitutional provision has been interpreted to
secure the right to a jury trial in all causes of action previously
triable by a jury at common law."3 7 The drafters of this provi-
sion did not intend that this Article extend the right; rather it
merely maintained the right as it existed at common law.' 8 Con-
sequently, the right to a jury trial is not applicable to statutory
actions,' 9 special proceedings ' " or suits in equity,'" but is re-
131. Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1942). See also
Collins v. Government of Virgin Islands, 366 F.2d 279 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 958 (1966); Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74
(1954); People v. Medcoff,.244 Mich. 108, 73 N.W.2d 537 (1955).
132. See Deberry v. Cavalier, 113 Cal. App. 30, 297 P. 611 (1931); 50
C.J.S. Juries § 9 (1947).
133.
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
134. Louisiana and Colorado are the only states which do not guarantee
trial by jury in a civil suit for a common law action.
135. Indianapolis St. Ry. v. O'Donnell, 35 Ind. App. 312, 330-31, 74
N.E. 253, 254 (1905).
136. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Harvey, 209 Ind. 262, 198 N.E. 782
(1936); Mitlers, Nat'l Ins. Co. v. American State Bank, 206 Ind. 511, 190
N.E. 433 (1934).
137. Dean v. State Bd. of Medical Registration and Examination, 233
Ind. 32, 116 N.E.2d 503 (1954). See Warren v. Indiana Tel. Co., 217 Ind. 93,
26 N.E.2d 399 (1940).
138. Id.
139. Lake Erie, W. & St. L. R.R. v. Heath, 9 Ind. 558 (1857).
140. Lipes v. Hand, 104 Ind. 503, 1 N.E. 871, rehearing denied, 104 Ind.
503, 4 N.E. 160 (1885); Shupe v. Bell, 127 Ind. App. 292, 141 N.E.2d 351
(1957) (statutory pleadings in juvenile court not triable by a jury).
141. Hiatt v. Yergin, 152 Ind. App. 497, 284 N.E.2d 834 (1972); Martin
v. Martin, 118 Ind. 227, 20 N.E. 763 (1889); Small v. Binford, 41 Ind. App.
440, 83 N.E. 507, rehearing denied, 41 Ind. App. 440, 84 N.E. 19 (1908);
McBride v. Stradley, 103 Ind. 465, 2 N.E. 358 (1885).
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quired, if requested, in all common law suits based on negligence."4 2
An action for medical malpractice, since it was and remains a
common law action in tort,4 3 is therefore protected by the con-
stitutional guarantee of trial by jury.
Indiana courts have recognized the sanctity of the right to a
jury trial and have scrupulously guarded it against any encroach-
ment. 4 Accordingly, any usurpation of the ordinary functions
of the jury must be deemed an infringement of the constitutional
right; any legislation authorizing such an infringement is there-
fore unconstitutional.'45 Before demonstrating the manner in
which the $500,000 limitation infringes upon the right to trial
by jury, a brief examination of the jury's duties in civil actions
is necessary.
The jury's responsibilities primarily include a determination
of all material factual issues arising in a lawsuit. 4 A suit for
142. In Warren v. Indiana Tel. Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d 399 (1940),
the Indiana Supreme Court held:
Actions for injuries to the person caused by the negligence of an-
other were known under the common law of England, and triable
by a jury. It follows, therefore, that the right to a jury trial in
common law actions for injuries to the person due to ndgligence is
fully protected by Article 1, § 20 of our Constitution.
Id. at 102, 26 N.E.2d at 403; City of Terre Haute v. Deckard, 243 Ind. 289,
183 N.E.2d 815, 817 (1962). See also Magner, A Plea for Proved Values:
Keep the Jury in Accident Litigation, 50 A.B.A.J. 1140 (1964).
143. The Malpractice Act did not supersede or otherwise alter the com-
mon law cause of action. Liability of health care providers is premised on a
finding of malpractice which is defined as "any tort or breach of contract
based on health care or professional services rendered, or which should have
been rendered, by a health care provider, to a patient." IND. CODE § 16-9.5-
1-1(h) (Supp. 1975). Under the Act, tort is defined as "any legal wrong,
breach of duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately causing
injury or damage to another." IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-1(g) (Supp. 1975).
144. Indianapolis St. Ry. v. O'Donnell, 35 Ind. App. 312, 74 N.E.
253 (1905). Cf. City of Terre Haute v. Deckard, 243 Ind. 289, 183 N.E.2d
815 (1962).
145. 17 I.L.E. Jury § 56 (1959). See also Kelly v. Herbst, 202 Ind. 55,
170 N.E. 853 (1930); Redinbo v. Fretz, 99 Ind. 458 (1884); Shaw v. Kent,
11 Ind. 80 (1858), Lake Erie, W. & St. L. R.R. v. Heath, 9 Ind. 558 (1857).
146. The seventh amendment right to trial by jury, which is a corollary
to the individual state constitutional guarantees, has been construed by the
United States Supreme Court to,
preserve the substance of the common-law right by jury, as distin-
guished from mere matters of form and procedure, and particularly
to retain the common-law distinction between the province of the
court and that of the jury, whereby . . . issues of law are to be
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medical malpractice raises at least two material issues: one is
the liability, if any, of the defendant ;147 and the other is the
amount of damages, if any, incurred by the plaintiff.1 4 1 Under
the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, the jury retains fully the
function of resolving the question of liability when the contesting
parties are unable to reach a settlement.' 4 It still possesses the
ultimate power to determine whether in a particular case the
defendant-doctor was negligent. However, the jury's determina-
tion of damages is severely restricted by the statute's monetary
limitation on recovery.
At common law, the right to compensatory damages was an
integral aspect of the adjudicatory process.'5 Compensation com-
mensurate with the injury incurred, being a question of fact,'5 '
was traditionally determined by the jury on an ad hoc basis be-
cause it was impossible to set a predetermined standard of re-
covery which was applicable to the many diverse personal injury
resolved by the court and issues of fact are to be determined by the
jury ....
Baltimore & C. Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1925). See Shearer v.
Porter, 155 F.2d 77, 81 (8th Cir. 1946); Novak v. Chicago & Calumet Dist.
Transit Co., 235 Ind. 489, 135 N.E.2d 1 (1956); E. CORWIN, THE CONSTrTU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES, REVISED AND ANNOTATED 895 (1952); Harring-
ton, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure--Severability of Issues-Do Separate
Trials of Issues of Liability and Damages Violate the Seventh Amendment?,
36 N.D. LAWYER 388 (1961).
147. 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 867 (1951); Louis AND WIl-
LIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, Damages 18.01 at 543 (1975).
148. In Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. L. R.R. v. Hadley, 102 Ind.
204, 82 N.E. 1025 (1907), the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that a "de-
termination of the extent of the injury complained of, and the proper com-
pensation therefor, were peculiarly within the province and power of the
trial jury. . . ." Id. at 216, 82 N.E. at 1030.
An excellent discussion of damages for a malpractice suit can be found
in Coombs v. King, 107 Me. 376, 78 A. 468 (1910). See also C. McCORMICK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES (1935); 4 BELLI, MODERN TRIALS (1959);
Bauer, Fundamental Principles of the Law in Medico-Legal Cases, 19 TENN.
L. REv. 255 (1946); Miller, The Contractual Liability of Physicians and Sur.
geons, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 412; Developments in the Law-Damages, 61 HAv.
L. REV. 113 (1947).
149. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-6 (Supp. 1975).
150. See Harrington, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure--Severability of
Issues-Do Separate Trials of Issues of Liability and Damages Violate the
Seventh Amendment? 36 N.D. LAWYER 388 (1961).
151. State v. Jacobs, 194 Ind. 327, 142 N.E. 715 (1924); City of North
Vernon v. Boegler, 103 Ind. 314, 2 N.E. 821 (1885); Auto Ins. Co. v. Mid-
Century Ins. Co., 147 Ind. App. 258, 259 N.E.2d 424 (1970).
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situations.' 2 What constituted reasonable compensation was an
individual determination based on the peculiar circumstances of
the injured party.'53
In Indiana, the ultimate question of the amount of damages
in negligence actions also "rests within the province and sound
discretion of the jury."'54 A judge may instruct as to the elements
of damage but he cannot define or calculate them with mathe-
matical certainty. 5' The jury's liberal discretion affords a plain-
tiff the opportunity to have objective parties make a reasonable
estimate of incurred damages which are commensurate with the
actual losses sustained." 6 This method of computation has been
utilized repeatedly to resolve personal injury cases.'5
The importance of the jury and its function of ascertaining
damages is underscored by the near absolute discretion granted to
the jury in determining the reasonable amount of the award. The
jury's decision is controlling, notwithstanding the fact that the
trial judge might have awarded a lesser amount.'58 Only when
the judge can say that the jury was swayed by such improper
motives as passion, prejudice or corruption may the court con-
152. Haskell & Barker Car Co. v. Trzop, 190 Ind. 35, 128 N.E. 401
(1924); Jackson v. Rutledge, 188 Ind. 415, 122 N.E. 579 (1919); Vandalin
Coal Co. v. Yerman, 175 Ind. 324, 92 N.E. 49 (1911); Kavanagh v. Butorac,
140 Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E.2d 824 (1966); Hooper v. Preuss, 109 Ind. App.
638, 37 N.E.2d 687 (1941).
153. Briggs v. Sneghan, 45 Ind. 14 (1873); Shelbyville Lateral Branch
R.R. Co. v. Lewark, 4 Ind. 471 (1853); Kavanagh v. Butorac, 140 Ind. App.
139, 221 N.E.2d 824 (1966); Pixley v. Catey, 102 Ind. App. 213, 1 N.E.2d
658 (1936).
154. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Cheek, 152 Ind. 663, 678, 53 N.E. 641, 646
(1899). See Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. L. R.R. v. Hadley, 102 Ind.
204, 216, 82 N.E. 1025, 1030 (1907). See also Collins v. Clayton & Lambert
Mfg. Co., 299 F.2d 362, 365 (6th Cir. 1962); Culbertson v. Haynes, 127 F.
Supp. 857 (N.D. Ind. 1955).
155. Vandalin Coal Co. v. Yerman, 175 Ind. 324, 92 N.E. 49 (1911).
156. Magner, A Plea for Proved Values: Keep the Jury in Accident
Litigation, 50 A.B.A.J. 1140 (1964).
157. See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES
§86 (1935).
158. The "thirteenth juror" rule has been used to describe the relation-
ship of the judge to the twelve jurors and, more specifically, the judge's duty
and right to condition a jury verdict or order a new trial if the damages
awarded by the jury are in his opinion not supported by a preponderance of
the evidence. For a good discussion of the "thirteenth juror" rule, see Borow-
ski v. Rupert, 151 Ind. App. 9, 281 N.E.2d 502 (1972). See also Bailey v.
Kain, 135 Ind. App. 657, 192 N.E.2d 486 (1963); 2 I.L.E. Appeals § 579
(1957).
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dition a judgment on an agreement to remittitur of damages or
order a new trial on the issue of damages.'59 Even in this situa-
tion, however, the judge cannot directly affect the jury award
since he cannot force the injured party against his will to accept
the lower amount of damages.'
In enacting the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, the legis-
lature infringed on the state constitutional right to a trial by jury
for civil suits."' The $500,000 limitation on the amount of re-
coverable damages is an undeniable restraint on the plaintiff's
right to have the ultimate damages issue adjudicated by the jury.'62
Whether the specific amount of the limitation established in the
Indiana Act is fair and just is not as much a paramount concern as
is the constitutionality of the legislature's attempt to invade the
159.
On the question of excessive damages in order to justify a reversal
"on such ground, the amount of damages assessed must appear to
be so outrageous as to impress the court at 'first blush' with its
enormity."
Indianapolis Transit, Inc. v. Moorman, 134 Ind. App. 572, 189 N.E.2d 111,
115 (1963), citing New York Cent. R.R. v. Johnson, 234 Ind. 457, 127
N.E.2d 603 (1955). See generally 2 I.L.E. Appeals § 579 (1957).
160. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889). See also C. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 77-84 (1935).
161. The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution, which
provides for a jury trial in all civil cases over twenty dollars, has not been
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and hence does not apply to the
states. See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Walker v. Sauvinet,
92 U.S. 90 (1875). Notwithstanding its inapplicability to the states, the sev-
enth amendment is controlling when a malpractice action under Indiana law
is filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. See Simler v. Conner,
372 U.S. 221 (1963); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356
U.S. 525 (1958).
162. One writer has recently stated that the $500,000 limitation on re-
coverable damages does not violate the right to jury trial. See Note, A Con-
stitutional Perspective on the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, 51 IND. L.J.
143, 154 n.65 (1975). The argument runs as follows: Juries decide triable
issues of fact. The legislature in enacting a damage limitation eliminates
any triable issue of fact above $500,000. Consequently, no question is raised
regarding the right to trial by jury. Id. Under this analysis, the legislature
could presumably limit damages to one dollar without violating the right to
trial by jury.
The fallacy of the above argument is plain; it ignores the fact that lia-
bility under the Malpractice Act remains based in common law actions of
tort or contracts. Unlike workmen's compensation, as the same writer ad-
mits elsewhere, "The Malpractice Act . . . in no sense abolishes the cause of
action for malpractice." Id. at 159. Since the right to jury trial attaches
fully to common law actions, see note 142 supra, the legislature cannot in-
fringe upon that right either in whole or in part.
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established province of a jury. It is contradictory to say that a
person has the constitutional right to a trial by jury while
tying the hands of the jury by restricting their award to an arbi-
trary figure, despite the clear weight of the evidence on actual
damages. Hence, because the right to a jury trial embraces the
guarantee of a jury which freely weighs the evidence presented
and awards damages after an independent finding of fact, the
$500,000 limitation in the Indiana Act is unconstitutional.
Nor is this constitutional infirmity remedied by arguing that
the proposed limitation on damages is a limitation on a patient's
right to damages and not a limitation on the right to trial by jury.
To accept such a contention would allow the legislature to in-
fringe substantially upon a major function of the jury indirectly
even though it could not do so directly. So long as injured pa-
tients in Indiana must obtain relief for medical malpractice by
suing on common law negligence, they are entitled to a trial byjury. This guarantee includes the independent determination of
damages assessed by the jury. Any attempt by the legislature to
circumvent the constitutional requirement of civil jury trials in
medical malpractice actions is an indefensible violation of the
Indiana Constitution. Accordingly, the $500,000 limitation on re-
coverable damages can only be seen as a clearly unwarranted and
illegal infringement on the fundamental right of trial by jury.
Furthermore, the $500,000 limitation must be stricken as creating
an irrebuttable presumption which denies due process of law.
C. Precluding A Patient from Proving the Extent of Actual Loss:
An Irrebuttable Presumption
An additional constitutional defect in the Indiana Medical
Malpractice Act is the irrebuttable presumption created by the
$500,000 damage limitation. By limiting damages to $500,000,
the statute conclusively assumes that an injured patient's loss
can never exceed that amount in all cases and it precludes him
from proving otherwise. Where alternative means are available
for accomplishing the legislative purpose of eliminating excessive
awards to victims of medical malpractice, a statutory presump-
tion, made conclusive without regard to actualities, contravenes
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution. Even administrative convenience and "neces-
sity" cannot justify "denying a litigant the right to prove the
facts of his case. ' 3 Accordingly, the $500,000 ceiling on recover-
able damages must fail.
163. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 329 (1932).
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The rule against statutory irrebuttable presumptions is an in-
tegral part of the procedural due process protection afforded by
both the fifth and fourteenth amendments.'" Its force is derived
from the requirement that the state may not deprive a person of
benefits or property rights without a fair hearing.' 5 Stated sim-
ply, a statute will be struck down as creating an unconstitutional,
irrebuttable presumption if it denies rights and benefits to certain
persons on the basis of a legal conclusion which rests upon non-
existent facts and does so without affording the litigant an op-
portunity to rebut that conclusion.' 68 Often such statutes have
been advocated on the grounds of administrative efficiency and
necessity. But the Supreme Court has been firm in rejecting such
contentions, particularly where alternate and less intrusive means
are available to the state for accomplishing its objectives.'6
164. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973); Heiner v. Donnan,
285 U.S. 312, 325-26 (1932); Collidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582, 596 (1930).
It has also been determined that statutes creating irrebuttable presump-
tions violate the fourteenth amendment right to equal protection. See Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 447 n.40 (1973), citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 349-52 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 656 (1969), and
Carringten v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965). See generally Bezanson, Some
Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, 7 IND. L. REV.
644 (1974).
165. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 517
(1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
166. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 657 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971); Heiner v.
Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 325 (1932).
167. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Supreme Court
stated:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legiti-
mate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in
constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of
the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in par-
ticular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a
vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and
efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no
less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
Id. at 656. The next year, in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), the Court,
after citing the above Stanley quote, continued:
The State's interest in administrative ease and certainty cannot in
and of itself save the conclusive presumption from invalidity under
the Due Process Clause where there are other reasonable and prac-
ticable means of establishing the pertinent facts on which the State's
objective is premised.
Id. at 451 (emphasis added). See United States Dep't of Agriculture v.
Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 513-14 (1973).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1976], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss2/5
1976] INDIANA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT 333
The various statutes which have been nullified for creating
irrebuttable presumptions illustrate the impermissible character of
a statute which denies rights on the basis of a conclusion not
necessarily true in fact without affording opportunity to rebut
that conclusion. An early example of a statute creating an ir-
rebuttable presumption is a section of the estate tax which treated
all gifts made within two years of death as gifts in contemplation
of death for estate tax purposes.' 8 The underlying assumption
was that all such gifts were transferred for tax avoidance and
that necessity required including those gifts springing from other
motives.'"" Holding that,
[t]he State is forbidden to deny due process of law or
the equal protection of the laws for any purpose what-
soever,"'
the Court declared:
[A] statute which imposes a tax upon an assumption of
fact which the taxpayer is forbidden to controvert, is so
arbitrary and unreasonable that it cannot stand under
the 14th Amendment.'7 '
An irrebuttable presumption is unconstitutional, the Court con-
cluded, because "a legislative body is without power to . . . deny
... a litigant the right to prove his case."'' 7 2 Although more re-
cent cases have discussed the availability of alternative means for
the states to obtain their objective, 73 the Court has continued to
nullify statutes which do not allow a person to disprove statutory
presumptions.' 7 4
168. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
169. Id. at 328.
170. Id. at 325.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 329.
173. See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). There is, however,
no reported case known to this author which upheld a statute creating an
irrebuttable presumption on the sole ground that no alternatives were avail-
able to the state to obtain its legitimate objective.
174. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S.
508 (1973) (statute denying food stamp eligibility on basis of irrebuttable
presumption of lack of need held unconstitutional); Viandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441 (1973) (irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency of student invalidated);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (irrebuttable presumption preventing
unwed fathers' custody of their children violative of due process) ; Stewart v.
Wohlgemuth, 355 F. Supp. 1212 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (irrebuttable presumption
terminating welfare benefits of college students violative of due process);
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That the $500,000 limitation in the Indiana Medical Malprac-
tice Act establishes an unconstitutional, irrebuttable presumption
is clear. Assuming that injuries to victims of medical malpractice
cannot exceed $500,000 in value ' and that necessity requires
eliminating excessive awards for this type of personal injury, the
statute precludes plaintiffs from proving otherwise. As such,
gravely injured patients whose reasonably foreseeable medical
expenses and compensable injuries actually do exceed $500,000
are denied "the right to prove [their] case."'6 This denial cannot
be countenanced, particularly since alternative means are avail-
able for preventing excessive judgments and since no award in
Indiana, to this author's knowledge, has ever exceeded this arbi-
trar-y amount.
Owens v. Parlam, 350 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (irrebuttable presump-
tion reducing shelter allowance on ground that members of household bear pro
rata share of expenses violative of due process) ; Boucher v. Minter, 349 F.
Supp. 1240 (D. Mass. 1972) (irrebuttable presumption terminating shelter
allowance where stepfather lives in same house violative of due process).
175. Some may argue that the Indiana Legislature in enacting the
$500,000 limitation did not assume any facts at all; that this limitation is a
substantive rule of law designed to curb excessive damage awards. Thus, it
is contended, the legislature was not at all concerned with making a pro-
cedural rule of law which denies injured parties from proving their case.
However, even assuming the propriety of this viewpoint, the monetary ceil-
ing on malpractice awards still violates due process. The substance and effect
of this statute acts precisely as if it were a procedural presumption-the
litigant is deprived of rebutting the statutory presumption that an award to
him of greater than $500,000 is excessive.
In Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932), the Supreme Court rejected
the contention that a statute which created an irrebuttable presumption is a
rule of substantive law rather than procedural law and, hence, should be up-
held. In reaching its decision, the Court expressly held the distinction be-
tween substantive and procedural law with regard to incontrovertible dis-
tinctions immaterial:
However, whether the latter presumption be treated as a rule of evi-
dence or of substantive law, it constitutes an attempt by legislative
fiat, to enact into existence a fact which here does not, and cannot
be made to, exist in actuality .... It is apparent . . . that a consti-
tutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by the creation
of a statutory presumption any more than it can be violated by direct
enactment. The power to create presumptions is not a means of
escape from constitutional restrictions.
If a legislative body is without power to enact as a rule of evi-
dence a statute denying a litigant the right to prove the facts of his
case, certainly the power cannot be made to emerge by putting the
enactment in the guise of a rule of substantive law.
Id. at 329.
176. 280 U.S. at 329.
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Several less intrusive methods for preventing excessive medi-
cal malpractice awards presently exist, and others may be adopted
by the state, if large recoveries are shown to be excessive in fact
and to pose a real threat to medical services. One means of re-
ducing excessive claims has already been established by the Act
itself. The medical review panel' 77 enables parties to negotiate a
settlement since both sides can compromise and arrive at a satis-
factory award. If the panel's decisions are accepted by all parties,
the chance of a sympathetic jury and the additional expense of
actual litigation are eliminated. Another safeguard which has al-
ways been available to the trial judges is remittitur.'78 If the trial
judge believes that the jury's award is excessive for any amount
due to sympathy, he may condition the monetary judgment on a
lower amount of damages. In addition, Indiana could enact laws
similar to the workmen's compensation system and abolish the
traditional tort-based system of liability. As part of the new
system of laws, a scheduled rate of recovery could be enacted
making all recoveries subject to a specific limitation." 9 A further
remedy to the treatment of excessive damages which the legislature
included in the Act is a ceiling on attorney's contingency fees.'
80
It is possible that the jury may award lesser amounts to compen-
sate injured persons if they know that the lawyer's fee will not
leave the patient undercompensated.
Another reason for striking the irrebuttable presumption es-
tablished by the $500,000 limit is that although there has never
been an award in excess of $500,000, the legislature has adopted a
measure which drastically reduces individual rights but does not
make anywhere near a commensurate return in achieving the
goal of eliminating excessive recoveries. In United States De-
177. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-1 (Supp. 1975). Similar panels have been de-
clared unconstitutional as violative of due process and free access to the
courts. See, e.g., Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Ass'n, No. 48075 (Ill.
S. Ct., May 14, 1976). Pollard v. Hendry County Hospital Authority, No.
75-11 (Hendry Cty. Cir. Ct., Nov. 28, 1975); and Arnold v. Tennessee, No.
A-6030 (Tenn. Chancery Ct., Dec. 4, 1975). For a general discussion of the
details see 19 A.T.L.A. NEws LETrER 18 (February, 1976).
178. 9 I.L.E. Damages § 168 (1971). See generally Indianapolis St. Ry.
v. Kane, 169 Ind. 25, 80 N.E. 841 (1907); Conwell v. Jeger, 21 Ind. App.
110, 51 N.E. 733 (1898); Lambert v. Blackman, 1 Blackf. 59 (1820).
179. Replacement of the present malpractice system by a compensatory
scheme like workmen's compensation laws would have to provide injured pa-
tients with a reasonable substitute for their lost rights. See notes 105-14,
supra and accompanying text.
180. Under the new Act, lawyers' contingency fees are limited to 15%
of any recovery above $100,000. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-5-1 (a) (Supp. 1975).
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partment of Agriculture v. Murry,'8' the Supreme Court struck
down a statute which "creates 'an irrebuttable presumption con-
trary to fact' "82 and which statute "goes far beyond [Congress']
goal.... " 83 The statute under consideration" ' rendered an entire
household ineligible for food stamps for two years if a member
of that household had been claimed as a tax dependent during the
first year by taxpayers who were themselves ineligible for food
stamp relief."' The Court noted that in enacting the provision,
Congress' main concern was with "abuses of the program by 'col-
lege students, children of wealthy parents.' ""8 Yet the Act was
nullified since,
[H]ouseholds containing no college student, that had es-
tablished clear eligibility for Food Stamps and which still
remain in dire need and otherwise eligible are now denied
stamps if it appears that a household member 18 years
or older is claimed by someone as a tax dependent.'8
Because of the overkill in individual rights compared with the
contribution toward eliminating welfare abuse, the Act could
not withstand constitutional challenge.
The Indiana Act is similarly defective. A recent commen-
tator has revealed that as of 1975, no award in Indiana has ever
exceeded $500,000." It is self-evident, then, that this ceiling will
181. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
182. Id. at 512, quoting district court's opinion, 348 F. Supp. 242, 243
(D.D.C. 1972).
183. Id. at 513.
184. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1973).
185. 413 U.S. at 511.
186. Id. at 513.
187. Id., quoting district court's opinion, 348 F. Supp. 242, 243 (D.D.C.
1972).
188. One commentator suggests that the medical malpractice problem in
Indiana has worsened drastically in the past five years and that preceding
this recent phenomena "a malpractice action was rare, and settlement or re-
covery was even less frequent." Stewart, The Malpractice Problem-Its Cause
and Cure: The Physician's Perspective, 51 IND. L.J. 134 n.1 (1975). In sup-
port of this observation an article in the Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone,
Jan. 14, 1975, at 1, col. 1, was cited which stated that the average award in
malpractice cases during the 1970 to 1975 period was reportedly $282,403.
During the period 1930 to 1970 the average award was reported to be $23,127.
Id. at n.1.
In direct contrast to these statistics are the findings published by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare and known as the REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973). In this com-
prehensive report, it was disclosed that more than half of the claimants
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do little, if anything, to alleviate the purported problem of ex-
cessive awards. To deny those few, very seriously injured liti-
gants who are in actual need of and who are entitled to care and
compensation in excess of $500,000, because juries might imper-
missibly make greater awards, cannot be countenanced.
In sum, the $500,000 statutory limitation on awards for medi-
cal malpractice creates an unconstitutional irrebuttable presump-
tion. By conclusively presuming that the value of a patient's in-
juries and his reasonably foreseeable medical expenses can never
exceed that limit, the Act denies him the fair hearing guaranteed
by due process of law. This deprivation is particularly indefen-
sible in light of the availability of other means for preventing ex-
cessive judgments and the slight contribution which this provi-
sion will make toward eliminating them.
Thus, the $500,000 limitation on recoverable damages may
be assailed on several constitutional grounds. In contravention
of due process guarantees and unlike workmen's compensation
legislation, it abridges a common law right; yet it does not provide
a reasonable substitute. Furthermore, by fettering the jury's dis-
cretion to determine damages commensurate with actual sustained
injury, the provision violates the right to trial by jury. An addi-
tional due process deprivation is the Act's conclusive presumption
nationwide who received payment obtained less than $3,000 and that only 3
percent of all claimants received amounts in excess of $100,000. Id. at 10-11.
According to the annual statements filed with the Department of Insurance
in 1974 by Medical Protective Company and St. Paul Fire and Marine, the
total amount of direct losses paid to Indiana claimants in 1974 was 1.5 mil-
lion dollars from 6.7 million dollars collected in premiums. See Memorandum
by John Dickerson and Gavin Lodge, SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INSURANCE
AND CORPORATIONS, March 21, 1975.
An extremely thought provoking article recently appeared in C. Hooden-
pyl, Medical Malpractice Litigation in Indiana, 20 RES GESTAE 126 (March,
1976). A recent survey was conducted of the medical malpractice cases re-
ported by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Indiana during
the last ten years (Jan. 1, 1965 to Dec. 31, 1975) in an effort to evaluate the
so-called "crisis" in Indiana. The result of the survey indicated that,
only twelve medical malpractice cases were reported during the sur-
vey period. Of the twelve reported cases, the defendant won six and
the plaintiff won six. . . . [I]n only one reported case did the de-
fendant argue on appeal that the damages awarded to the plaintiffs
were excessive.
Id. at 128. That case, Carpenter v. Campbell, 149 Ind. App. 189, 271 N.E.2d
163 (1971), involved a jury award for $15,000 in damages to compensate a
claimant for hand injuries due to the negligent administration of a caustic
drug while hospitalized. See C. Hoodenpyl, Medical Malpractice Litigation in
Indiana, 20 RES GESTAE 126, 128 n.5 (March, 1976) for a list of the cases re-
ported.
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that the value of litigants' injuries and reasonably foreseeable
medical expenses does not exceed $500,000. Hence, both due
process and trial by jury rights require that the limitation on
damages be nullified. However, not only is the $500,000 limita-
tion constitutionally suspect, so too is the new statute of limitations
applicable to minors who are injured by medical malpractice.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: AMPUTATION OF MINORS'
RIGHTS TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS
In addition to limiting recoverable damages to $500,000, the
Indiana Medical Malpractice Act further reduces the financial
liability of health care providers by drastically decreasing the
time period in which a minor may file a malpractice claim. Prior
to this Act, minors were not subject to the two year medical mal-
practice statute of limitations. 8 As with any legal claim, minors
had until their twentieth birthday to bring a malpractice action.
The new Act, however, removes the legal disability privilege from
minors with malpractice claims"9 ° by establishing a statute of
limitations whereby children under the age of six have until their
eighth birthday to file and those over six have only two years
from the date of occurrence.' 9 ' It is the contention of this note
that this unique statutory provision makes two distinct and arbi-
trary classifications whereby minors with malpractice claims are
deprived of the equal protection of the laws as secured by the
fourteenth amendment.
189. In Chaffin v. Nicosia, 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d 867 (1974), the
Indiana Supreme Court overruled Byrd v. McCullough, 217 F.2d 159 (7th
Cir. 1954), which had applied the former two year malpractice statute of
limitations, IND. CODE § 34-4-19-1 (1973), to minors. Holding that the mal-
practice statute "must not be allowed to produce an absurd result, which the
legislature, as a reasonably minded body, could not have possibly intended,"
Chaffin held that the legal disability statute, IND. CODE § 34-1-2-5 (1973), was
a "legislative recognition of an exception to an otherwise absolute bar on
medical malpractice suits." 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d at 870. Thus, Chaffin
changed the law so that minors would have two years after the termination
of their disability (eighteen years) to file their malpractice claim.
190. The new statute removes all legal disability except for the explicit
provisions for minors. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-3-1 (Supp. 1975).
191. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-3-1 (Supp. 1975), provides:
No claim, whether in contract or tort, may be brought against a
health care provider based upon professional services or health care
rendered or which should have been rendered unless filed within two
(2) years from the date of the alleged act, omission or neglect except
that a minor under the full age of six (6) years shall have until his
eighth birthday in which to file. This section applies to all persons
regardless of minority or other legal disability.
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The first challenged classification affects all minors and is
based upon the type of tortious activity which causes injury. While
minors with medical malpractice claims are denied the protection
of the legal disability statute, minors with other personal injury
actions retain this privilege and, thus, may file their claim at any
time prior to their twentieth birthday. The constitutional infirm-
ity of such a classification based on the type of claim is that the
state's interest in this field is highly suspect and possibly without
merit. Even assuming the validity of that interest, the classi-
fication does not rationally promote the purported state interest.
Minors with malpractice claims are further discriminated
against by age classification. Those who are less than six years
of age are given until their eighth birthday to file their malprac-
tice claims; minors between the ages of six and eighteen lose their
cause of action two years after the injury. This legislative classi-
fication, based solely on age, it is contended, is arbitrarily and
unnaturally drawn, and, hence, cannot withstand an equal protec-
tion challenge. Since the two classifications, one based on type of
claim and the other on age, are entirely distinct, they will be
examined separately. Before analysis begins with the classifica-
tion based on the type of claim, a brief review of equal protection
analysis is warranted.
As a general rule, legislation which classifies groups of citi-
zens does not constitute a denial of equal protection. 9" All classi-
fications must, however, be reasonable, not discriminatory, and
apply to and affect equally all persons within the specified
classes."9 3 To determine whether a particular statute violates the
192.
It is unnecessary to say that the "equal protection of the Laws" re-
quired by the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent the States
from resorting to classification for the purposes of legislation. Nu-
merous and familiar decisions of this court establish that they have
a wide range of discretion in that regard.
F.S. Royster Guana Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See also
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911); District of
Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 150 (1909); Thompson v. Kentucky, 209
U.S. 340, 348 (1908).
193. McLaughin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1964); F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S.
26, 29-30 (1913). But, in defining the bounds within which such classifica-
tions will be upheld, the court in McLaughin added that,
[fjudicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause, . . . does not
end with a showing of equal application among the members of the
class defined by the legislation. The courts must reach and deter-
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provisions of the equal protection clause, it must be determined
whether the statute does, in fact, create different classes of citi-
zens and, if so, whether that classification has any discriminatory
effect on either class. 1 4 The state's interest and purpose in cre-
ating the classification must then be examined to determine the
authority of the state to interpose its authority on behalf of the
public interest.'" Finally, and most importantly, a determination
must be made as to whether the classification created bears any
rational relation to the articulated state interest."6 A statute will
be invalidated as violative of equal protection unless it satisfies
each of these tests.
A. Classification Based on Type of Claim
The statute of limitations for minors in the Medical Malprac-
tice Act clearly establishes different classes of minors. Minors
with malpractice claims are now treated differently than minors
with any other type of legal claim. By design, the protection of
the legal disability statute, which guarantees to all minors free
and meaningful access to the courts,'" is abrogated for minors
with malpractice claims.
mine the question of whether the classifications drawn in a statute
are reasonable in light of its purpose.
379 U.S. at 191. See note 196 infra.
194. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20
(1973) ; State Bd. of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931).
195. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV.
L. REv. 1065, 1077-78 (1969). Cf. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962).
196. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974); San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40, 55 (1973); McGinnis
v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973).
197. A fundamental premise of our legal system is that every man,
woman and child will have an equal opportunity to present their cases to an
impartial court. Willging, Financial Barriers and the Access of Indigents to
the Courts, 57 GEO. L. REv. 253, 285 (1968), citing Address by Professor Lon
Fuller, Harvard Law School Sesquicentennial, Sept. 22, 1967. The right to
free access to the courts is guaranteed in art. 1, § 12 of the Indiana Con-
stitution. See Chaffin v. Nicosia, 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d 867, 871 (1974).
See also Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 18:
Adjudication we may define as a social process of decision which
assures to the affected party a particular form of participation, that
of presenting proofs and arguments for a decision in his favor.
... Whatever impairs that participation detracts from its integrity.
When that participation becomes a matter of grace, rather than of
right, the process of decision ceases to deserve the name of adjudi-
cation.
Id. at 19.
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Furthermore, minors with malpractice claims are directly in-
jured by the statutory classification. Indeed, the combination of
the victim's physical immaturity and often hard-to-detect injuries
combine to make the consequence of the deprivation of the protec-
tion afforded by the legal disability provision particularly harsh
on minors with malpractice claims.'98 Present medical science and
technology are understood only by specialists extensively trained
in special areas of medicine. The obvious complexity inherent in
medical diagnosis and treatment is compounded by the fact that
many of the serious injuries are internal and, hence, are detect-
able only with great difficulty. In addition, certain injuries may
not be apparent until the child is an adult. Yet minors, at the
peril of losing their right to compensation altogether, are pre-
sumed capable of detecting their injuries and are held responsible
for filing their malpractice claims at a very early age. Ironically,
a child in a personal injury case, who sustains obvious external
injuries, is given until his twentieth birthday to file his claim,
because he is assumed unable to detect the extent of his disabili-
ties and unable to appreciate their legal ramifications. Yet a child
injured by medical personnel is expected to discover and appre-
ciate, both medically and legally, the consequences of complex and
severe internal injuries.
Those fortunate minors who do have their day in court have
the additional burden of recovering adequate and accurate com-
pensation due to the uncertainty regarding the extent of their in-
jury. It is hornbook law that a plaintiff must prove the extent
of his injury with reasonable certainty.'99 But the severity of in-
jury sustained by children is bften indeterminable. Accordingly,
damage awards and the evidence upon which they are based are
more speculative when a child is ten, for instance, than when he
matures to the age of majority. A jury faithfully following a
court's instructions on reasonable certainty may not adequately
compensate an injured child. On the other hand, a jury conscious
of these inequities might return a very large award to compen-
sate for these contingencies. Should the latter frequently occur,
the Malpractice Act will have contributed to an increase in medi-
198. See Chaffin v. Nicosia, 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d 867, 870-71 (1974).
199.
The plaintiff has the burden of proving the nature, extent, and per-
manence or probable duration of his injuries and his loss of time
and impairment of future earning capacity.
2 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 18.10 (1975). See generally
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 at 143-44 (4th ed. 1971).
et al.: The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: Legislative Surgery on Patie
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1976
342 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
cal costs to insurance companies, rather than the decrease for
which it was designed. Should the former occur, the minor or
his family will be forced to bear the additional expense incurred
by the negligence of a legislatively protected health care provider.
In either case, the abrogation of legal disability of minors injured
by medical personnel is difficult to support. Not only is it readily
apparent that the harshness of immediate liability determinations
clearly discriminates against minors with medical malpractice
claims, but it is even questionable as a solution to the supposed
malpractice insurance crisis. Why then did the state enact such
a measure, and what were its interests in doing so?
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act is a response to the
medical profession's highly publicized complaints that they are
being victimized by spurious and excessive claims which threaten
the future of their profession.0 0 In order to protect public health,
safety and welfare, the state is attempting to preserve its health
care system by eliminating excessive malpractice claims, which
are seen as a major factor endangering the health care system.
One source of excessive malpractice claims, the legislature ap-
parently feels, is injuries to minors for which claims may not be
made until years after their occurrence. Although the state's au-
thority to protect the general public health, safety and welfare is
unassailable when a valid threat appears,20 ' the need to deprive
one class of minors of protection from the legal disability statute
in the present situation appears to be a premature exercise of the
state's power.
To begin with, no hard data has been introduced to warrant
the diminution of rights of injured patients in Indiana. Accord-
ing to the annual financial statements filed by Medical Protective
Company and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, the
number of suits and amount of awards against health care pro-
viders in Indiana actually decreased in 1974.202 In 1973, these two
companies processed forty-four hundred claims; in 1974, the num-
200. See generally Gray, The Insurer's Dilemma, 51 IND. L.J. 120 (1975);
Chicago Tribune, February 27, 1976 § 1, at 1, col. 1. A spokesman for the
Illinois State Medical Society's board of trustees indicated that "there is a
strong sentiment on the part of many doctors to dramatize the seriousness
of the problem." One recourse under consideration was a doctors' strike simi-
lar to the one earlier this year in California. Id.
201. See Goldbatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962).
202. See Memorandum by John Dickerson and Gavin Lodge, SENATE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INSURANCE AND CORPORATIONS, March 21, 1975.
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ber of malpractice suits dropped to thirteen hundred.2 3 Along
with the decreased number of suits, there was a corresponding
decrease in the amount of claims paid by insurance companies
through settlements and judgments.2 ' Thus, Indiana passed this
restriction on minors' rights in order to decrease the amount of
unwarranted recoveries despite the fact that statistics suggest
that insurers of Indiana health care providers were not facing an
excessive increase in either the number or amount of claims.
The Indiana Act may also have been based on the assump-
tion that the state should intervene to protect the health care sys-
tem by decreasing the number of frivolous and spurious suits.
There is absolutely no reason, however, to conclude that the claims
of minors were either spurious or excessive. No evidence was
presented to show that the number of medical malpractice suits
was even influenced by the number of suits filed by minors. Re-
gardless of the number of suits initiated by minors, it is irrational
to conclude that the claims of minors are always frivolous or
spurious when they are not filed for several years after the com-
plained-of negligence.
Perhaps the strongest interest of the state in abrogating the
legal disability privilege for minors with medical malpractice
claims may have been to protect the insurance industry.2 " It is
claimed that in an inflationary economy, the prolonged period in
which insurers are exposed to liability makes risk coverage highly
uncertain and speculative. According to insurance companies, this
uncertainty is partially responsible for causing drastic increases
in insurance rates for medical malpractice coverage." 6 But this
203. The number of suits filed against insureds covered by Medical Pro-
tective Company decreased from 658 in 1973 to 137 in 1974. During the same
period of time, St. Paul Fire and Marine experienced a similar decline in the
number of claims from 3,746 to 1,156. Id.
204. In 1973, Medical Protective paid $828,538 in Indiana for "direct
losses incurred" (amounts attributed to awards and settlements); in 1974
this amount dropped to $610,117. St. Paul Fire and Marine experienced an
increase from 1783,779 in 1973 to $946,284 in 1974. The net effect, therefore,
in "direct losses paid" by these two companies (writing 80 to 85% of all
policies in Indiana) was a decrease of $55,000. Id.
205. See Mallor, 'A Cure for the Plaintiff's Ills?, 51 IND. L.J. 103, 104
(1975), citing STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON EXECUTivE REORG. OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON GoV'T OPERATIONS, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Medical Malpractice: The
Patient Versus the Physician 12 (Comm. Print, 1969).
206. See generally ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY,
POSITION PAPER AND BACKGROUNDER [pertaining to medical malpractice cover-
age] (1975).
343
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extended exposure is not unique to the health care system; all tort-
feasors who injure minors are subject to the same threatened
financial loss. If insurance companies can effectively force the
state to eliminate the legal disability statute to make losses more
predictable in medical malpractice, there is no reason why they
cannot and would not attempt to do the same for all other types
of insurance." ' Furthermore, no evidence has been presented to
justify such harsh treatment of minors injured by negligent medi-
cal personnel as opposed to minors injured by negligent automo-
bile operators. In fact, there is absolutely no evidence that the
alleged high cost of insurance is caused by minors' malpractice
claims.2 8 Insurance companies have failed to come forward with
any statistical proof of the real causes of rising claims and con-
sequent need for increasing rates in Indiana. In the absence of
any true threat to public health or welfare caused by minors, In-
diana has no authority to infringe upon their rights by the pres-
ent assertion of state police power. In any event, insurers can
avoid much of the uncertainty which the former legal disability
statute causes in rate making by writing "claims made" rather
than "occurrence" based insurance.209
Even if the state could show a need to protect the health
care provider by eliminating minors' legal disability in the Indi-
ana Act, equal protection analysis still demands a determination
of whether the classification of minors with medical malpractice
claims bears any rational relation to the state's purpose.2 ' As
noted, the state has an interest in reducing the number of exces-
sive or spurious claims against health care providers and the
high cost of insurance. However, a statutory classification,
must involve something more than mere characteristics
which will serve to divide or identify the class. There
207. An excellent brief develops this idea of the so-called "crisis"
approach. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital
Association, et al., No. 48075 (Supreme Court of Illinois, 1976).
208. Noticeably absent from the POSITION PAPER AND BACKGROUNDER
by St. Paul insurers was any reference to excessive risks posed by the de-
layed suits incurred by minors. See note 206, supra.
209. See Note, The "Claims Made" Dilemma in Professional Liability
Insurance, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 925, 928-29 (1975). A "claims made" policy
is one whereby the carrier agrees to assume liability for any errors, includ-
ing those made prior to the inception of the policy, as long as a claim is made
within the policy period. An "occurrence" policy provides coverage for any
acts or omissions that arise during the policy period, regardless of when
claims are made. Id. at 925-26.
210. See cases cited in note 196 supra.
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must be inherent differences in situations related to the
subject matter of the legislation.2 "'
Under the Indiana Act, minors are denied the protection of
the legal disability statute merely because their claims are against
health care providers. The purpose of the legal disability statute,
however, is to guarantee all minors the right to free access to
the courts.2 " Therefore, the privilege may not be denied to minors
because of the claims they assert. Rather, the right to extended
access to the courts is granted on the assumption that minors,
as a natural class, cannot, by using reasonable diligence, utilize the
judicial system to protect personal and constitutional rights. Since
minors are presently unable to sue for themselves, the legal dis-
ability statute affords them an extended period of time to pro-
tect those rights.
While the legislature has the power to determine the ages of
majority and competency, the competence of a minor to file a
claim for damages cannot be distinguished or said to be less im-
paired because his claim is for medical malpractice. For example,
assume that a person negligently runs into another car and in-
jures a child passenger. Although the child may be quite aware
of the resultant pain and injury, he is entitled to await his eigh-
teenth birthday and two years thereafter before bringing an ac-
tion against the negligent party.2 3 On the other hand, if a doctor
leaves a scalpel or sponge in a six-year-old child, the child will
lose his cause of action for negligent injury if he fails to file a
suit before he reaches age eight. ' Identical disabilities and in-
firmities are shared by both minors; yet the Indiana Act distin-
guishes minors with medical malpractice claims and denies them
the protection available under the legal disability statute.
The same reasons for permitting a minor to postpone a claim
for damages applies in both malpractice and non-malpractice cases.
Damages are difficult to establish during minority. Indeed, the
nature of the injury, its permanency and its subsequent effects
are not easy to ascertain. Furthermore, the minor cannot be ex-
pected to appreciate and, hence, fully protect the legal rights avail-
211. Heckler v. Conter, 206 Ind. 376, 381, 187 N.E. 878, 879 (1933).
212. See Chaffin v. Nicosia, 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d 867 (1974). See
generally 43 C.J.S. Infants § 19 (1945).
213. The age of majority in the legal disability statute was amended
in 1973 to change "persons within the age of twenty-one [21] years" to "per-
sons under the age of eighteen [18] years." IND. CODE § 34-1-2-5 (1973).
214. IND. CoDE § 16-9.5-3-1 (Supp. 1975).
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able to him. Despite the identical disabilities faced by the minor,
in other types of negligence cases he will be able to postpone his
claim for damages until age twenty, but in the malpractice case
his right to recover damages is lost at age eight, if he is injured
when under six, or two years after infliction of an injury when
he is older than six.
The extremely harsh and potentially unconstitutional conse-
quences which minors deprived of the legal disability privilege in
medical malpractice actions sustain is not ignored by Indiana
courts. In Chaffin v. Nicosia,"'1 the Supreme Court of Indiana,
evidencing a deep concern for fully protecting minors, unequivo-
cally rejected an attempt to deny to minors the legal disability
privilege in medical malpractice suits. To avoid the "extraordi-
nary harsh result" of a minor losing a valid cause of action," '
the court construed the legal disability statute as a privilege
rather than a statute of limitations so that it would not be in
conflict with and therefore superseded by a two-year statute of
limitations which ostensibly related to all medical malpractice
claims." 7 Admonishing against impeding the rights of minors,
the court declared:
To construe the medical malpractice statute as a legisla-
tive bar on all malpractice actions under all circum-
stances unless commenced within two years from the
act complained of (discoverable or otherwise) would raise
substantial questions under the Article 1, § 12 guarantee
of open courts and redress for injury to every man, not
to mention the offense to lay concepts of justice.2 '
Yet, in spite of this recent pronouncement by the Indiana Su-
preme Court, the Indiana legislature has forged ahead, unhin-
dered by hard, supportive data, and has stripped minors of the
protection which the Indiana Supreme Court was so careful to
preserve.
215. 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d 867 (1974).
216. 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E.2d at 871.
217. The prior statute of limitations for malpractice read:
No action of any kind for damages, whether brought in contract or
tort, based upon professional services rendered or which should have
been rendered, shall be brought, commenced or maintained, in any of
the courts of the state against physicians, dentists, surgeons, hos-
pitals, sanitariums, or others, unless said action is filed within two
(2) years from the date of the act, omission or neglect complained of.
IND. CODE § 34-4-19-1 (1973).
218. 310 N.E.2d at 870.
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Thus, the state's exercise of its police power in denying legal
disability protection to minors injured by medical personnel is
improvident and perhaps unconstitutional. Many medically caused
injuries may go undetected until too late or, for fear of losing
a valid claim, minors and their parents might be more likely to
file an action. As a result, the number of medical malpractice
claims could increase rather than decrease. Furthermore, it is
foreseeable that juries would increase the size of verdicts in order
to compensate for uncertain but possible complications. Again,
the result would be increased insurance premiums. On the other
hand, conscientious jurors, faithfully adhering to time-honored
legal doctrine, might under-compensate injured minors and thus
force the minors and their families to pay for their doctors' mis-
takes. Regarding the constitutionality of this provision, neither
data relating to the general need for malpractice reform nor data
relating to malpractice suits by minors has been produced which
support the legislature's creation of a classification which works
such harsh results on minors. In addition, the Indiana Supreme
Court recently cast grave doubt on whether such a provision can
pass constitutional muster. As shall be shown, the legislature will
probably not fare much better with its age-based classification.
B. Classification Based on Age
The second classification created by the Indiana Act classifies
minors with malpractice claims on the basis of age. Minors under
six years of age are permitted to file suit until age eight, regard-
less of when the injury occurred.2 19 Minors who are six years or
older, however, are given only two years after the date of injury
to file a claim for damages.20 This classification overlooks the
characteristic disabilities shared by all minors when it arbitrarily
assumes that minors between the ages of six and eighteen years
should be treated like adults for purposes of litigating medical
malpractice claims.
The gravamen of an equal protection violation is unreason-
ably treating like groups differently.22 ' The legislature cannot
take what might be termed a,
219. IND. CODE § 16-9.5-3-1 (Supp. 1975).
220. Id.
221. See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). See
also Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1965,
1079 (1969).
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natural class of persons, split that class in two, and then
arbitrarily designate the dissevered factions of the orig-
inal units as two classes and thereupon enact different
rules of government on each."'
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, however, redefines the age
of legal disability for medical malpractice actions, and, in so doing,
enacts one rule of government for one group of children and an-
other rule of government for another group of children. Classes
created by changing age limits for legal disability cannot be legiti-
mized where there is no reasonable difference between children
of one age and those of another. Absent any reasonable distinc-
tion between children under six years and those over six, the
classification arbitrarily discriminates in its application.2 "
Minors over six years as well as minors under six have a
real need for protection from tortfeasors endowed with superior
knowledge of complex medical and legal issues. Regarding the
ability to detect latent injury and to assert legal rights, the only
difference between a five-year-old and a ten-year-old is that the
ten-year-old is five years closer to being able to fend for himself.
A child of ten may be more aware and more articulate than a five-
year-old child, but it would be ridiculous to assert that the ten-year-
old is as astute or as responsible as an adult. Until the child can
assume responsibility for the decisions he makes, it would be
manifestly unjust to deprive him of a fair opportunity to make
those decisions. Instead of recognizing the obvious limitations of
all children which mitigate against the effective assertion of their
legal rights in the medical malpractice context, the Indiana Act
chooses to ignore the disadvantages of those children between six
and eighteen years of age.
222. Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465, 467 (1927),
citing State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 31 S.W. 781 (1895) ; and State v. Miksicek,
225 Mo. 561, 125 S.W. 507 (1910).
223. A vivid illustration of the necessary distinction required in classi-
fications for legislative purposes can be found in the often repeated language
of Tanner v. United States, 240 U.S. 369 (1915) :
Red things may be associated by reason of their redness, with dis-
regard of all other resemblances or of distinctions. Such classifica-
tion would be logically appropriate. Apply it further; make it a
rule of conduct; depend upon it; and distinguish in legislation be-
tween red-haired men and black-haired men, and the classification
would have only arbitrary relation to the purpose and province of
legislation.
Id. at 382.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1976], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss2/5
1976] INDIANA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT 349
The discriminatory treatment which is worked by the Indi-
ana Act against minors over six years of age with malpractice
claims cannot be justified by their exposure to teachers, medical
examiners and other public officials at school. Proponents of the
age distinction apparently theorize that school personnel will be
able to discover injuries from malpractice which parents do not.
But it is difficult to see how a teacher could discover all but the
most obvious physical or mental impairment, and, most impor-
tantly, know its source. None would deny that children develop
at different rates and that some are brighter than others. Simi-
larly, how will the standard vision and hearing examiner discover
an internal injury which is not readily apparent? Even if he
does, how will he know its full effect on a maturing body? With-
out substituting an alternative form of adequate protection for
those minors above age six, equally in need of that protection
afforded by the legal disability statute to those under age six,
,the Act's two year statute for six- to eighteen-year-olds is a de-
nial of the equal protection of the laws and, as such, cannot be
sustained.
Thus, as with the classification based on the type of tortious
conduct giving rise to the claim, the Indiana legislature has acted
both improvidently and unconstitutionally. Instead of protecting
its minor constituents, all of whom suffer from, for all practical
purposes, the same limitations, it has denied them the necessary
time to discover the existence and the extent of their injuries,
and the time necessary to be able to adequately assert their rights.
Such legislative largess was accomplished without even providing
a reasonable substitute.
In sum, the Indiana legislature, by enacting the statute of
limitations for minors with medical malpractice claims, has carved
out special privileges for the health care industry. In so doing, it
seriously infringes upon the rights of minors who are the victims
of this privileged class' negligent acts. Minors who suffer injury
through medical malpractice are deprived of any meaningful ex-
ercise of their constitutional right to access to the courts. This
substantial loss is permitted even though their weaknesses, dis-
abilities and needs are identical to minors injured by non-medical
tortfeasors, while this latter group of minors still enjoys the pro-
tection of the legal disability statute. The legislature, by protecting
the pocketbook of the medical tortfeasor, has amputated the rights
of the victim. In addition, and more seriously, this amputation
affects those who most need the protection of the Constitution-
minors, who cannot articulate their physical and mental condition,
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who cannot know the full extent of their injuries, and who can-
not act competently to assert and preserve their legal rights.
CONCLUSION
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act contains several legis-
lative provisions which may be explained with the benefit of re-
flection and additional information as an overreaction to the pres-
ent panoply of "crisis" situations. Responding to this "crisis,"
measures were taken to unduly restrict the rights of injured
patients. Persons least able to bear the financial consequences of
wayward medical and health care treatment were chosen to sacri-
fice the greatest protection of the laws. When tested in the courts,
several provisions of the Act can expect to receive severe consti-
tutional challenges.
Among the most objectionable provisions of the Act is the
$500,000 limitation on recoverable damages. By granting the
negligent health care providers limited liability, the Act deprives
a patient of the right to reasonable compensation in violation of
due process of law. The ceiling on damages is initially a retrac-
tion of the common law right to recover a fair award for negli-
gent acts. Unlike the workmen's compensation laws, no reason-
able substitute is given in return for the invasion of this right.
Additionally, the restriction on the common law right to damages
violates the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial by infringing
on the jury's duty to determine reasonable damages. Finally, the
$500,000 limitation, based on the assumption that awards in ex-
cess of that amount are excessive, denies due process of law by
creating an irrebuttable presumption which precludes a patient
from proving and receiving actual damages beyond that amount.
A second aspect of the Act's unconstitutional restrictions elimi-
nates the legal disability statute for minors who are injured by
medical malpractice. By treating minors with malpractice claims
differently from minors with other tort claims, the Act creates
two separate classifications which are violative of equal protec-
tion. The first, based upon the cause of injury, treats more
favorably children injured by non-medical tortfeasors. The second,
distinguishing between children under six years and older chil-
dren, grants more favored status to the younger group. In both
cases, there are no relevant differences between the classes
which warrant unequal treatment. Accordingly, the provision
which alters the minor legal disability statute must be stricken as
an arbitrarily drawn statute which denies minors equal protection
of laws.
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Aside from the particularly objectionable portions of the Act
itself, the real danger which it presents is the ready resort to
limiting individual access to unfettered jury determinations. If
the legislature can be influenced by insurance companies and
negligent insureds to limit damages in medical malpractice, there
is no reason why the same persuasion cannot be as effectively ap-
plied to all other claims based on negligence or contract. All law-
yers and insurance companies are familiar with the sudden growth
of products liability. Is that the insurance companies' next tar-
get?2 ' Such speculation can hardly be dismissed as alarmism on
what seems to be the eve of enactment of federal no-fault legisla-
tion for automobile related torts."' If the no-fault experience is
any indicator, the sad result is that the victims will bear increased
cost, and litigation will not be significantly diminished. The
genius of the common law is its adaptability. The same is true
with capitalism as an economic system. Certain means for reduc-
ing malpractice premiums, for example, writing "claims made"
insurance, are already available. Rather than hastily impairing
full access to courts, legislatures should allow economic factors
and the judiciary to solve the "crisis," by means less oppressive
to individual freedoms.
224. O'Connell, Bypassing the Lawyers, The Wall Street Journal, April
8, 1976, at 16, col. 4.
225. See, e.g., Brock, Federal "No-Fault" Insurance, 42 INs. COUNSEL J.
359 (1975); Kircher, Federal "No-fault" Insurance-S. 854, 41 INS. COUN-
SEL J. 602 (1974); Janata, The National No-fault Motor Vehicle Act, 41 INS.
COUNSEL J. 211 (1974).
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